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ENFORCING STATE LAW IN
CONGRESS'S SHADOW
Robert A. Mikos-
Congress imposes a variety of sanctions on individuals who have been
convicted of state crimes. This Article argues that these sanctions may distort
the enforcement of state law. By raising the stakes involved in state cases, the
federal sanctions may cause defendants to contest state charges more vigor-
ously, thereby producing one of two unintended consequences. First, the
sanctions make it more costly to enforce state laws. Second, due to resource
constraints or dislike of the federal sanctions, states may attempt to circum-
vent the sanctions by manipulating charging decisions. In the process, how-
ever, states may have to reduce their own sanctions as well, thereby
undermining deterrence and the fair application of both state and federal
law. The Article theorizes that the severity of the sanctions and the emphasis
they place upon state outcomes, among other factors, determine how much the
sanctions will distort state proceedings. The Article then substantiates the
thecny with five in-depth case studies offederal sanctions. It suggests ways to
ameliorate the concerns raised herein. It concludes by demonstrating that the
analytical framework can be applied more broadly to sanctions imposed and
determinations made by any two separate parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress imposes a variety of sanctions on individuals who have
been convicted of state crimes. For example, federal law prohibits
convicted domestic abusers from possessing firearms; it denies federal
benefits to convicted drug offenders; and it requires the deportation
of aliens convicted of crimes ranging from shoplifting to sexual as-
sault.1 The sanctions Congress imposes supplement the punishment
levied by the states, and are thus referred to as federal supplemental
sanctions.2
I Some federal laws also attach a sanction to a determination the states themselves
do not consider to be a conviction, such as a no-contest plea accompanied by a suspended
sentence. See infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
2 Supplemental sanctions are a type of collateral sanction. The key distinguishing
feature of these collateral sanctions is that they are imposed by one sovereign based upon
convictions obtained by another. For a recent descriptive study of collateral sanctions, see
Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social Context of
Collateral Consequence Statutes, 31 J. CRiM. JusT. 435 (2003). For an earlier study, see Walter
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Hundreds of thousands of state criminal cases must be resolved
in the shadow of these federal sanctions every year. In 2003 alone,
nearly 80,000 aliens were deported for being convicted of assorted
crimes, and most of these crimes were prosecuted by the states. 3 That
same year, more than 35,000 applicants were denied federal student
financial aid because of prior drug convictions, again, most of which
had been obtained by state prosecutors. 4 Every year, federal law per-
manently strips hundreds of thousands of convicted domestic abusers
of their right to possess firearms, many of whom will lose their jobs as
a result. 5 What is more, there is evidence the shadow over state law
enforcement is growing. Until two decades ago, the federal govern-
ment was deporting fewer than 2,000 criminal aliens each year. 6 Re-
cent amendments to federal immigration law have subjected many
more criminal aliens to deportation and have rendered most of them
ineligible for waivers, thereby making deportation a nearly automatic
consequence of a qualifying state conviction. 7 Many other federal
laws imposing significant supplemental sanctions were passed between
1996 and 1998.8
Despite the widespread use of federal supplemental sanctions,
they have received scant attention from either courts or scholars, and
their potential impact on the enforcement of state law has gone unno-
ticed.9 This Article provides the first analysis of federal supplemental
Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VANo. L. REV. 929 (1970).
3 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YRBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 150 (2004), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
aboutus/statistics/2003Yearbook.pdf. The government tracks deportations by crime type,
but not by jurisdiction of conviction. For a discussion of how to apportion the number of
deportations triggered by state, as opposed to federal, convictions, see infra note 94.
4 See E-mail from Dan Madzelan, Office of Postsecondary Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ.
(July 2, 2004) (forwarded to author on Aug. 10, 2004) (on file with author). We may infer
that most denials of student financial aid were occasioned by state convictions since the
states handle the vast majority of drug cases. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LAN-
Gr- j, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ 206916, FELONY SENrENCES IN STATE CouRsS, 2002, at 3 tbl.
(2004) (reporting 340,340 felony drug convictions in state courts in 2002, compared to
only 26,234 felony drug convictions in federal courts), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf.
5 See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
" IMMIGRATION & NATURALZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF TrHl IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 171 (1997) (reporting that
the deportation of criminal aliens has "increased greatly" since 1986, when the INS re-
moved 1,978 criminal aliens).
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra Part IIB-C.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 1999) (dismissing the
claim that a federal firearms ban triggered by a state restraining order interferes with the
operation of state law: "Nothing in the state court proceeding changes on account of or is in any
way affected by, the operation of the federal law." (emphasis added)); Daniel Kanstroom, Deporta-
tion, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARv. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2000) (criticizing the deportation of criminal aliens on fairness
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sanctions as a distinct form of federal regulation. The Article presents
a theory of how the sanctions affect the enforcement of state law. It
argues that many sanctions make it more costly for states to enforce
their own laws, draining state budgets and undercutting the deterrent
effect and the consistent application of both federal and state law. 10
Federal supplemental sanctions are intended to serve a variety of
purposes. By increasing the total sanction levied for violating state
law, the sanctions may deter people from committing crimes in the
first instance. Some sanctions may also incapacitate individuals who,
by reason of their state conviction, have demonstrated that they pose a
continuing threat to society; the Lautenberg firearms ban, which takes
guns out of the hands of convicted domestic abusers, is typical. I t Or
Congress may have in mind a distinctly federal purpose unrelated to
the traditional goals of the criminal law; for example, Congress might
order the deportation of criminal aliens in order to maintain public
support of federal immigration policies. 12
Whatever the intended purpose, tying federal sanctions to deter-
minations made by state officials is attractive to Congress for a simple
reason: since the states determine who is subject to the sanctions,
Congress avoids the costs of making that determination itself, thus
conserving federal resources. In essence, Congress free rides on the
efforts of state law enforcement agencies. Because federal supplemen-
tal sanctions are considered to be regulatory as opposed to criminal
sanctions, they do not trigger the constitutional safeguards attending
grounds, but conceding that the practice constitutes "efficient" crime control policy); An-
nette M. Toews, Citizenship Considerations in Minnesota Criminal Justice and the Supremacy of
Federal Immigration Law, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. Riv. 1245, 1302 (1999) ("Whether a non-
citizen incurs immigration consequences because of their criminal activities and convic-
tions is a concern for the federal, not state, government.").
10 On a more general level, this Article contributes to a larger, established body of
scholarship examining the perverse effects of severe or rigid sentencing policies. For a
sampling of the relevant literature, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT' AND DE-
MOCRAcY: THREE STIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CAIFORNIA (2001) (concluding that Califor-
nia's three strikes law has dramatically increased the prison population and undermined
proportionality and uniformity in sentencing, but has only slightly reduced crime in the
state);Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Coporate Criminal Liability, 23J. LEGAL
STUD. 833 (1994) (concluding that holding corporations criminally liable may cause firms
to reduce their own expenditures on detecting and deterring wrongdoing); Arun S. Malik,
Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RANDJ. EcoN. 341 (1990) (showing that it
may not be optimal to impose the maximum fine when offenders can engage in activities
that reduce the probability of being caught and fined); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284 (1997) (surveying the effect of
harsher penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines on plea negotiations).
II See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (9) (2000).
12 For a discussion of the purposes that supplemental sanctions might serve, see infra
Part 1.A.
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criminal punishment.' Indeed, because they often involve the denial
of some benefit, rather than the imposition of imprisonment or other
expensive punitive measures, supplemental sanctions are usually quite
cheap for Congress to impose.
For the sanctions to work as Congress intends, it is essential that
they not disturb how the states enforce their laws. This Article argues,
however, that some federal sanctions cast a dark shadow over pending
state criminal cases. The sanctions raise the stakes involved in state
cases and thereby cause defendants to contest state charges more vig-
orously. On the one hand, states may have to take more cases to trial.
Defendants will be less willing to plead when doing so triggers a stiff
federal sanction. The costs of meeting the added resistance, what this
Article calls the "implementation costs" of the sanctions, are borne
primarily by the states and not by the federal government.
On the other hand, a state may try to skirt the federal sanctions,
either to minimize the costs of enforcing its own laws or to thwart
federal policies with which the state or its agents disagree. The state
can, for example, charge bargain with a defendant, offering a plea
involving a crime that does not trigger the federal sanction. The new
bargain, however, may carry a lower state sanction as well, and this
may undermine the traditional objectives of the criminal law, such as
deterrence or retribution. This distortion produces what this Article
calls the "circumvention costs" of supplemental sanctions.
Due to their reliance on state law enforcement, federal supple-
mental sanctions also impose substantial fairness costs. For one thing,
the sanctions undermine a state's ability to enforce its own laws con-
sistently. For example, a state prosecutor might drop certain charges
against an alien but not a citizen, because the alien faces deportation
if convicted. The sanctions are also applied inconsistently across
states, because the states define crimes differently.
Aside from elaborating on these efficiency and fairness concerns,
the Article also suggests why inefficient and unfair supplemental sanc-
tions are apt to be adopted and maintained. In particular, it argues
that no safeguard exists to ensure the benefits of the sanctions justify
their costs. 14 Congress has little incentive to lift or moderate its sanc-
tions, since the costs of imposing them are borne by the states. (For
the same reason, Congress may not even be aware of these costs.) By
13 The test for distinguishing between regulatory and punitive sanctions is laid out in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
14 See infta note 36 and accompanying text. For recent works discussing coordination
of sanctions, see generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanc-
tions from Damages, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 401 (2001) (courts and private citizens), and Nuno
Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties, 6 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 410 (2004)
(courts and administrative agencies).
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1415 2004-2005
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
contrast, a state is likely to moderate its own sanctions when they
prove costly to impose. 15
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the core theoreti-
cal contributions of the Article. It begins by explaining how and why
Congress uses state convictions to trigger federal sanctions. Using a
simple hypothetical, it then demonstrates how the sanctions affect the
state cases that trigger them. After identifying three hidden costs the
sanctions may impose, Part I concludes by exploring several factors
that make these costs more or less likely to appear. Part II examines
five federal supplemental sanctions in great detail: the criminal alien
deportation provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the
Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, and federal laws
banning convicted drug offenders from receiving federal welfare, pub-
lic housing, and student financial aid benefits. These case studies
lend strong empirical support to the theories developed in Part I.
Part III suggests actions that Congress and the states might take to
ameliorate the policy harms created by the sanctions. Finally, Part IV
considers some logical extensions of the analysis.
I
THE SHAIDOW OF FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL SANCTIONS
This Part contains the core theoretical insights of the Article. It
begins by defining supplemental sanctions with more precision and
elaborating upon how they work and what purposes they serve. It pro-
ceeds to use a simple numerical example to demonstrate how the
sanctions affect state proceedings. It then reflects upon the example
to illuminate three hidden costs associated with the sanctions. The
final section concludes by identifying a variety of factors that explain
when these costs will arise.
A. What They Are, Why They Are Used, and How They Work
When a state official determines that a state law has been vio-
lated, federal supplemental sanctions are the consequences that fol-
low by operation of federal law. The sanctions are civil in nature and
thus do not include imprisonment, fines, or other forms of "punish-
ment" in the constitutional sense. From the perspective of the one
who is sanctioned, however, they inflict losses that are just as real as
and that add to any penalty the state itself might impose. Supplemen-
tal sanctions are usually triggered by a state court conviction, but they
could, in theory, attach to any action taken by a state, such as the entry
15 See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2003, at Al (noting that concern over costs of incarceration spurred twenty-five
states to reduce or eliminate mandatory sentences for some crimes in the prior year).
1416 [Vol. 90:1411
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of a no-contest plea that does not count as a conviction under state
law.
State convictions provide Congress with free information it can
use to serve its own purposes. 6 Foremost among these purposes is
protecting the public safety. The federal government reasons that in-
dividuals who have been convicted of certain state crimes pose a con-
tinuing threat to society. 17 The Lautenberg Amendment to the
Federal Gun Control Act, for example, takes firearms out of the hands
of convicted domestic abusers who might otherwise kill their victims
in a fit of rage.18
By increasing the total sanction levied for violating state law, sup-
plemental sanctions may also deter potential offenders from commit-
ting the crimes that trigger the sanctions. The Lautenberg firearms
ban, for example, may deter some potential abusers from committing
acts of domestic violence, particularly those who value access to fire-
arms most. The federal welfare ban, which prohibits anyone con-
victed of a state (or federal) drug felony from receiving federal
welfare benefits, likewise might deter drug use among the poor.'
However, it is unclear that supplemental sanctions are effective as
a deterrent. If potential offenders are unaware of the supplemental
sanctions when they commit their crimes, then the sanctions cannot
deter them. Supplemental sanctions, like other collateral conse-
quences of a conviction, are less visible to potential offenders than are
the primary sanctions for the crime, such as incarceration, probation,
and fines. 20 Defendants frequently discover the sanctions only after
16 For a discussion of the purposes behind collateral consequence laws more gener-
ally, see Buckler & Travis, supra note 2, at 436-39 (identifying four such purposes, includ-
ing maintaining public confidence in the effective operation of government, protecting
individuals from harm, punishing criminals, and a variety of pragmatic ends, such as facili-
tating the adoption of the children of inmates).
17 See id. at 437-38; cf Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 120 (1983)
("Congress .. .use[s] state convictions to trigger [firearms] disabilities .. .not because
Congress wanted to tie those disabilities to the intricacies of state law, but because such
convictions provide a convenient, although somewhat inexact, way of identifying 'espe-
cially risky people."' (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345 (1971))).
18 See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)( 9 ) (2000)).
19 See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2000).
20 See United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissent-
ing) (decrying the lack of notice given to those who are subject to the Lautenberg firearms
ban, and concluding that when a law is kept a secret, it is "not a deterrent. It is a trap.");
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'x REv. 153, 161 (1999) ("[T]he relatively low visibility of
collateral consequences makes them unlikely deterrents to crime."); Grant et al., supra
note 2, at 1224 (arguing that the "difficulty of determining the disabilities imposed in any
state, coupled with widespread public ignorance of criminal penalties, makes the deterrent
function of civil disability laws highly questionable").
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they have been charged with a state crime, when it is too late to deter
them, but not too late to affect state proceedings.2 '
Indeed, supplemental sanctions may actually undermine deter-
rence of state crimes by reducing the total sanction imposed for violat-
ing state law. As explained below, the sanctions sometimes reduce the
likelihood that an offender will be charged and convicted of a state
crime that triggers them. This could in turn affect the behavior of
criminals ex ante. For example, knowing that a state prosecutor is re-
luctant to charge any offense that triggers a federal sanction, potential
criminals may be emboldened to commit more of these crimes.
In addition to incapacitating and deterring the dangerous, Con-
gress may use state determinations in making decisions about the allo-
cation of scarce public resources, such as welfare benefits or public
housing units. The federal government may believe that, all things
being equal, convicted drug felons are less deserving of federal wel-
fare benefits, public housing, or student loans than their law-abiding
counterparts. 22 State convictions may thus serve as a proxy for
"unworthiness."
Using state judgments to impose federal sanctions has enormous
practical appeal. Making federal determinations about who is danger-
ous or unworthy-which might involve federalizing a wide range of
crimes-would require the employment of additional federal investi-
gators, prosecutors, and courts. The off-the-shelf information pro-
vided by the states may not fit federal aims perfectly-states, after all,
may decline to prosecute some individuals the federal government
would prefer to sanction, and may prosecute some individuals the fed-
eral government would prefer to exempt-but Congress apparently
thinks it does the job reasonably well and save the federal government
considerable expense. 23
The federal government must incur some costs to execute these
sanctions. But once the state has decided who will be sanctioned, the
21 See sources cited infra notes 129 & 160-62 and accompanying text.
22 E.g., President's Remarks Announcing the "One Strike and You're Out" Initiative
in Public Housing, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 582, 583 (Mar. 28, 1996) [hereinafter
President's Remarks] ("The only people who deserve to live in public housing are those
who live responsibly there and those who honor the rule of law.").
23 The benefit to the federal government is similar to the benefit enjoyed by litigants
who successfully invoke collateral estoppel in civil cases. The doctrine of collateral estop-
pel provides that when an issue is actually litigated and decided, and the decision is essen-
tial to the judgment in the case, the decision is conclusive in a subsequent action involving
the same or a different claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464 (2002) (noting
that the traditional role of mutuality has been largely abandoned, and that only the party
against whom preclusion is advanced need have been a party-or in privity with a party-
to the original proceeding). The doctrine thereby saves a party the expense of having to
relitigate an issue that has already been decided.
1418 [Vol. 90:1411
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federal government's remaining tasks are comparatively easy and inex-
pensive to perform. Following a state conviction, the federal govern-
ment executes its sanctions in one of three ways, requiring varying
degrees of administrative effort.
Some sanctions apply automatically without requiring the federal
government to take any steps. That is, carrying out the sanction is
nearly costless for Congress. The Lautenberg firearms ban is a typical
self-executing sanction. When convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, a gun owner is required to surrender possession of
his firearms immediately. The federal government makes no effort to
even inform the convict of the sanction, and compliance with the
sanction is entirely the responsibility of the party subject to it. To be
sure, not everyone will obey the law without some additional threat.
Hence, Congress has made violation of the Lautenberg firearms ban a
federal crime, punishable by up to ten years in prison and a $250,000
fine.2 4 Punishing those who violate the ban obviously costs some-
thing, but the amount pales in comparison to the amount spent prose-
cuting the hundreds of thousands of cases annually that trigger the
ban.
Other sanctions are executed when a party convicted of a trigger-
ing offense applies for a government benefit. These sanctions make
such persons ineligible to receive the benefit. For instance, when a
college student applies for federal financial aid, she must indicate
whether she has been convicted of a covered drug offense.2 5 If she
answers yes, she will be denied the aid. Since the federal government
already screens applicants for other reasons-need, degree sought,
etc.-the costs attributable to this sanction-adding a criminal history
question to the application and punishing false answers-are compar-
atively small. 26 The more difficult and expensive task-determining
whether an applicant has done something criminal-is again per-
formed by the state.
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2), 3571 (2000).
25 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OMB No. 1845-0001, 2005-2006 FREE APPLICATION FOR FED-
ERAL STUDENT AID 3 [hereinafter FAFSA], available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/
attachments/siteresources/2005-06_FAFSA app-form.pdf.
26 Verifying the truthfulness of responses is a tricky task for the federal government,
but it is not necessary to create a fool-proof verification system for the sanction to be effec-
tive. Despite the fact that the government currently has no way of verifying answers to the
drug conviction questions on the FAFSA, for example, many students admit to having dis-
qualifying drug convictions. See Peter Kempner, One Strike, You're Out; Drug War Takes Aim
at Students with New Financial Aid Question, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 6, 2000 ("The
government does not have the capability at this time to background check all applicants'
records in order to determine if they have a drug conviction. We are relying on the stu-
dents to use good judgment when answering...." (quoting an official with the Department
of Education)); E-mail from Dan Madzelan, supra note 4 (more than 35,000 applicants for
financial aid acknowledged drug convictions that made them ineligible for aid in
2003-04).
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1419 2004-2005
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Finally, some sanctions require the government (federal or some-
times state) to take more elaborate steps prior to imposing them. The
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, the successor to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service) must find and detain
aliens who are convicted of deportable offenses, and then, in many
cases, must provide these aliens a hearing before transporting them
out of the country.27 Likewise, when the government seeks to take
away a benefit it has already bestowed, say, food stamps or cash assis-
tance, it must give the recipient notice and the opportunity to be
heard before suspending the entitlement.2 8 The cost of the hearing
will vary depending on the extent to which the sanction is made dis-
cretionary; if the government recognizes few defenses or exceptions to
the imposition of the sanction, for example, the proceeding should be
short and simple.
B. How the Sanctions Affect Incentives
Ultimately, the sanctions may not work as Congress intends. The
sanctions alter the incentives of defendants and state prosecutors. For
defendants, the sanctions reduce the advantage of accepting a guilty
plea versus standing trial. For prosecutors, the sanctions create a di-
lemma: take more cases to trial, which is costly, or else modify the
charges involved in plea deals, which may require treating some
crimes more leniently as a matter of state law. This section uses a
simple hypothetical to illustrate the ways defendants and prosecutors
in state criminal cases react to federal sanctions.2 9 The next section
examines more closely the costs that are incurred as a result.
Suppose Jack, a citizen of the United States with no prior crimi-
nal record, threatens a store clerk and takes $1,000 worth of merchan-
dise. State police later arrest him. The state prosecutor could
reasonably charge Jack with one of three crimes. Robbery, a felony
punishable by a fine of $25,000 under state law, is the most serious
charge fitting the facts. Theft is also a felony, but carries a lesser fine
of $10,000. Shoplifting, the most lenient charge, is a misdemeanor
carrying a fine of only $1,000. These fines are mandatory and non-
27 See Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 367, 389-92 (1999) (discussing removal
procedures).
28 The government must not deny property, including welfare payments, without due
process of law. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). The sort of hearing that is
required is determined by the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976), which include the importance of the interest to the individual, the degree to which
the desired procedure will make a difference in the outcome, and the cost to the
government.
29 The illustration is simplified to highlight certain points. The case studies in Part II,
however, demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from this illustration hold up under
more realistic conditions.
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negotiable under the state's sentencing guidelines. In addition to the
fine imposed by the state, Jack must also bear his attorneys fees in the
case, which would be $10,000 if he stands trial or $1,000 if he instead
accepts a plea bargain with the prosecutor. The prosecutor's cost
structure is similar. In the event of trial, the jury would consider only
the charged crime (and no lesser offenses) and each side is equally
likely to prevail.
The prosecutor, not terribly concerned with this first-time of-
fender and desiring to devote her scarce time to investigating more
serious crimes, gives Jack two options: stand trial and be charged with
Robbery, or plead guilty to Theft. The total cost of the Theft plea to
Jack is $11,000 ($10,000 in fines plus $1,000 in legal fees) and is less
than the expected cost of trial of $22,500 ($12,500 in expected fines
plus $10,000 in legal fees). Therefore, like most other defendants fac-
ing criminal charges, Jack will accept the Theft plea. Not only does it
avoid the added expense of going to trial, it also removes the risk of
paying a higher fine if he were convicted of the more serious Robbery
offense.
Now, suppose Jack is not a United States citizen, but a legal alien
residing in this country, and that Congress will deport Jack if he is
convicted of any felony, including Robbery or Theft, but not a misde-
meanor, like Shoplifting. Jack has no desire to return to his home
country and values his continued presence in the United States at
$50,000. The expected costs of each ofJack's options under both sce-
narios are summarized below in Table 1.
TABLE 1: DEFENDANT'S ToTAL COSTS 30
No federal sanction Federal sanction
Plea charge offered by prosecutor Accept Plea Stand Trial Accept Plea Stand Trial
Robbery $26,000 $22,500 $76,000 $47,500
Theft $11,000 $22,500 $61,000 $47,500
Shoplifting $2,000 $22,500 $ 2,000 $47,500
The prosecutor will again offer Jack a Theft plea, but this time
Jack will not accept it. The federal sanction makes the total cost of
so Bold-faced cells indicate Jack's preferred (lowest-cost) strategy, plead or stand trial,
given the plea offered by the prosecutor. Barring any federal sanction, the total cost of
each plea includes the state sanction plus the lawyer's fee for negotiating the bargain
($1,000, regardless of the charge). The costs of trial include the lawyer's fee (a fixed
$10,000) plus the state sanction that would be imposed for Robbery ($25,000) discounted
by the probability of acquittal (here, 50%). when the federal sanction is included, the
calculation is done similarly, only now the cost of the supplemental sanction ($50,000) is
added to the cost of the plea for Robbery and Theft, but not Shoplifting, which does not
trigger it. The federal sanction is also added to the costs of trial, again discounted by the
probability of acquittal.
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that plea ($61,000) exceed the expected cost of standing trial
($47,500), even on the more serious Robbery charge. Instead, Jack
will counter with this ultimatum: either reduce the charge to Shoplift-
ing-to which Jack would gladly plead guilty-or take him to trial.
Jack's threat of taking the case to trial is credible. Trial is still a costly
option for Jack, but it gives him the chance to avoid the federal
sanction.
The prosecutor faces a dilemma in how to respond to Jack's
counteroffer. If the prosecutor accepts the offer, the total sanction
imposed on Jack would be reduced from $11,000 (outside the shadow
of the federal sanction) to only $2,000. If the prosecutor instead pro-
ceeds to trial on the Robbery charge, the total expected cost to Jack
increases to $47,500, but the prosecutor's costs of handlingJack's case
increase as well, from $1,000 to $10,000. Furthermore, the prosecutor
may not think that Jack deserves the additional federal sanction that
the Robbery conviction would trigger, and though this incentive is
hard to quantify, it no doubt affects the prosecutor's charging deci-
sions in some cases.
This simple illustration demonstrates the ways in which federal
sanctions alter the incentives of defendants and prosecutors in state
criminal cases. When plea agreements trigger federal sanctions, the
sanctions make trials appear relatively more attractive to the defen-
dant. The prosecutor must choose between charging the defendant
with a different (and often lesser) crime to get him to plead and tak-
ing the defendant to trial. The next two sections explore the hidden
costs imposed on the states and examine particular features of the
federal sanctions and state regimes that affect those costs.
C. The Hidden Costs of Federal Supplemental Sanctions
As shown above, some federal sanctions put states in a no-win sit-
uation. The sanctions make it more costly for states to obtain convic-
tions on sanction-triggering charges because defendants will contest
such charges more vigorously. To relieve the burden on state prose-
cutors or to spare defendants from sanctions it deems unjust, the state
may try to skirt the federal sanctions by offering plea bargains that do
not trigger them. These new bargains, however, may trigger lower
state sanctions as well, and may thereby compromise the deterrent ef-
fect and the consistent application of state law. Each of these possible
costs is explored below.
1. Implementation Costs
Increasing the sanction for a given crime may raise the costs of
prosecuting that crime. The additional cost of prosecuting state
crimes in the shadow of supplemental sanctions is what this Article
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calls the "implementation costs" of the sanctions. Because supple-
mental sanctions raise the stakes involved in state criminal cases, they
give defendants added incentive to contest state charges at every stage
of the state's case: upon arrest, at preliminary hearings, in plea negoti-
ations, at trial, through final appeal, and even in collateral attacks. 31
Consider Jack the defendant from our earlier hypothetical. Jack
would plead guilty to the crime of Theft if it carried only the state
sanction of $10,000, but he would refuse the same plea when the
$50,000 federal deportation sanction is added to the mix.3 2 In the
shadow of the threat of deportation, the state must now take him to
trial if it wants to convict Jack of Theft (or Robbery).
Taking a defendant to trial, however, is far more costly than nego-
tiating a plea.33 Trials consume more of the prosecutor's time and
energy; she must carefully assemble the case against the defendant,
respond to the defendant's discovery requests, help select a jury, file
and respond to evidentiary motions, make opening and closing state-
ments, examine witnesses, and, if successful, recommend a sentence
and respond to appeals and collateral attacks. Thus, even when fed-
31 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF Lxw 663 (5th ed. 1998) (ob-
serving that "[ilf the case is very important to the defendant, he may spend heavily on its
defense").
32 Defendants responded in similar fashion when the state of California dramatically
increased state-imposed sentences for repeat offenders. California's three strikes law inan-
dates a sentence of twenty-five years to life for the third strike. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)
(West 1999). After the law was adopted in 1994, trial rates rose significantly in third-strike
cases compared to non-strike cases. In the second half of 1995, for example, courts re-
ported that 41% of third-strike cases went to trial, versus only 4% of non-strike cases. See
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES LAW ON SUPERIOR AND MUNIC-
IPAL. COURTS SIjRVFv#2JULY-DECEMRER 1995, at 2 (1996), available athttp://www.courtinfo.
ca.gov/reference/documents/3strikes.pdf (also finding that defendants sought prelimi-
nary hearings in a comparatively high portion of third-strike cases); see also BD. OF CORR.,
THREE STRIKES, YOU'RE OUT: IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND OP-
TIONS FOR ONGOING MONITORING 8, 16 (1996) (reporting that police have encountered
more resistance from three-strikes defendants and public defenders' workloads have in-
creased significantly).
33 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE LJ.
1909, 1921 (1992) ("The prosecutor gains something very valuable when she avoids trial.
It is hardly surprising that she will pay handsomely for it.").
State officials (prosecutors, public defenders, and judges) must also invest in learning
how the sanctions work in conjunction with state law, putting even more burden on the
state fise. Cf Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the Alien
Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REv. 269, 276 (1997) (noting that "as immigration concerns become
closely intertwined with crime and punishment, aliens may be entitled to more expansive
procedural rights; effective defense representation will likely require counsel on immigra-
tion matters; and the ethical obligations of all criminal justice practitioners will likely
broaden to encompass immigration-related concerns").
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1423 2004-2005
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
eral sanctions cause only a few additional cases to go to trial, they add
substantially to a state's cost of enforcing its laws.- 4
Jack's case is hardly atypical. The shadow of federal sanctions
looms over hundreds of thousands of state criminal cases every year.
Each year, tens of thousands of immigrants are deported because they
have been convicted of a state crime; hundreds of thousands of per-
sons are barred from possessing firearms because they have been con-
victed of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in a state court;
and tens of thousands more are denied federal benefits like welfare,
public housing, and student financial aid because of state drug convic-
tions.3 5 Further, these figures do not capture the cases in which de-
fendants were able to escape the sanctions in the end, either because
they were acquitted of the state charges or because they negotiated
around the sanctions.
Ultimately, the problem with federal supplemental sanctions is
not just that they add to the cost of enforcing state law, for the sanc-
tions have some offsetting benefits, too. They deter criminal conduct
and incapacitate dangerous individuals, at least when they are im-
posed as Congress intended. The bigger problem is that there is no
way to be sure these benefits exceed the added costs. Since the imple-
mentation costs are borne by the states, Congress has too little incen-
tive to consider them when deciding upon legislation imposing
sanctions. This means Congress might impose excessive sanctions,
something it would be less likely to do if the sanctions loomed over
federal criminal cases instead.36
2. Circumvention Costs
Rather than take a defendant to trial, the state prosecutor may
instead elect to offer the defendant a more palatable plea bargain,
one which does not trigger the federal sanction. But circumventing
34 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number ofjudges and court facilities.").
35 See supra notes 3-5; infra Part II.
36 As Professor Deborah Merritt has argued, regarding federal motor voter registra-
tion laws,
The point is not that motor voter registration [which commandeers state
officials to register voters when they apply for drivers licenses] is a bad
idea-it may prove to be an excellent idea. The point is that the legislative
body adopting this legislation had no incentive to probe the costs of the bill
because someone else was going to pay the tab. That is not responsible
lawmaking.
Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1563, 1570 (1994); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MiCn. L. REv.
813, 893-900 (1998) (arguing that federal commandeering of state officials is inefficient
because the federal government fails to internalize the costs of the state services).
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federal sanctions often means charging defendants with lesser crimes
or simply dismissing state charges altogether, both of which lower the
average (state and total) sanction imposed.3 7 Lowering average sanc-
tions in turn undermines deterrence and the other traditional goals of
the criminal law. The reduction in deterrence attributable to efforts
to evade federal sanctions is what this Article calls the "circumvention
costs" of the sanctions.
There are two main reasons a state prosecutor would be willing to
circumvent federal supplemental sanctions, even though doing so re-
quires reducing the state sanction as well. First, the prosecutor may
not be able to afford to take the defendant's case to trial. Defendants
have tremendous bargaining power when prosecutorial budgets are
fixed, particularly when they know that the prosecutorial resources are
limited:
[T]he individual defendant has, in effect, a call on the prosecutor's
time. Each defendant can call on the prosecutor to try the case,
forcing her to use time and effort that would otherwise be spent
processing other cases. For the prosecutor, the opportunity cost of
a failure to purchase this call from any individual defendant sub-
stantially exceeds the transaction costs of negotiating an individual-
ized contract. 38
When the prosecutor has a fixed budget, she may have no choice but
to accept a plea suggested by the defendant, one that does not trigger
the federal sanction.
37 The tendency is for such bargains to lower total average sanctions. The reason is
that federal sanctions are normally triggered by more serious crimes. To circumvent the
sanctions, prosecutors must therefore reduce charges, sometimes considerably. See, e.g.,
Gene Schabath, Teen May Face Deportation; Immigration Officials Refuse to Guarantee They Won't
Send Boy in Incest Case to India, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 30, 1998, at 5B (prosecutor agreed to
reduce charge against teenager who molested his sister from first degree criminal sexual
conduct, punishable by life in prison, to fourth degree criminal sexual conduct, a misde-
meanor carrying a maximum sentence of two years, in an attempt to prevent the teen's
deportation).
In theory, given an infinite array of options, the prosecutor would charge the defen-
dant with a crime that carries the same state sanction as before but which does not trigger
the federal sanction. However, this is unrealistic for at least two reasons. First, state prose-
cutors do not have an infinite choice of charges to fit each case. In addition, federal sanc-
tions are often triggered by a broad range of charges meeting some threshold criteria
(crimes of moral turpitude, crimes that could be punished by more than one year in
prison, any misdemeanor that has as an element the use or attempted use of force, etc.),
making it difficult for the prosecutor to sidestep the sanction without agreeing to reduce
the charge. See infra Part I.D.I.c.
38 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 33, at 1924; see also id. at 1941 ("[A]djudication costs are
both high and disproportionately allocated to prosecutors. Prosecutors bear the burden of
proof and therefore must invest more in digging out and presenting evidence. Defendants
have a lesser burden of producing evidence; moreover, they often do not internalize their
own cost of legal representation." (footnotes omitted)).
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Recall the hypothetical example described above.3 9 Now suppose
the state prosecutor has a fixed budget of $20,000 and that, as before,
a plea costs $1,000, while a trial costs $10,000. The police have
presented the prosecutor with twenty individuals whom they suspect
have committed separate acts of Theft. Ignoring any federal sanction,
and assuming the defendants cannot collude with one another, the
prosecutor should be able to secure twenty Theft pleas from these
suspects. At $1,000 each, the negotiations would exhaust the prosecu-
tor's entire budget. Sanctions total $220,000 for all defendants com-
bined, including $20,000 in legal fees.
Now assume Congress imposes an additional $50,000 federal
sanction (in the form of deportation, a firearms ban, a benefits ban,
etc.) on any individual convicted of a felony, including Theft or Rob-
bery. As demonstrated above in Part II.B, the suspects will no longer
accept the Theft plea, so the prosecutor has three options: secure
twenty Shoplifting pleas, thereby imposing a total combined sanction
of $40,000; secure Shoplifting pleas from ten defendants and take one
additional defendant to trial on a Robbery charge (with an equally
likely chance of conviction as of acquittal), dismissing the charges
against the remaining nine offenders, for a total expected sanction of
$67,500; or take two defendants to trial on the Robbery charge, dis-
missing the charges against the remaining eighteen, for a total ex-
pected sanction of $95,000. In the shadow of supplemental sanctions
and fixed prosecutorial budgets, total sanctions will ironically drop by
more than half, from $220,000 to $95,000 (at most).
Even if the prosecutor had an unlimited budget, she would have
another reason to help a defendant evade the federal sanction: She
may think the sanction does not fit the defendant's crime.40 The pros-
ecutor may object to deporting a petty criminal, taking away firearms
from a domestic abuser (who also happens to be a police officer she
frequently collaborates with on other cases), or denying welfare bene-
fits to a needy mother who commits her first drug offense. Indeed,
prosecutors are not bound to pursue the most serious charges that are
supported by the evidence. The American Bar Association encour-
ages prosecutors "to seek justice, not merely to convict. ' 41 The prose-
39 In the hypothetical, Theft and Robbery are both felonies. Theft carries a $10,000
fine while Robbery carries a $25,000 fine. Shoplifting is a misdemeanor that triggers a
$1,000 fine.
40 Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988
(1992) (noting that state prosecutor's interests are often not perfectly aligned with those of
the public, causing less than optimal plea bargains from the public's perspective, usually in
"the form of unduly lenient sentence offers").
41 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993), available at WL SCJ 3-1.2;
see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 43.6, 44.4, 68.1 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n,
2d ed. 1991) (encouraging prosecutors to consider the collateral consequences of convic-
tion when making charging decisions).
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cutor in our hypothetical may think that imposing an expected cost of
$47,500 (including legal fees) on a defendant accused of Theft is un-
warranted. The prosecutor may thus be willing to accept a Shoplifting
plea from the defendant instead. The $2,000 sanction it carries is
lower than what she would prefer, but it may be much closer to what
she feels is deserved. The sanctions levied against all defendants add
up to $40,000, which may be even less than when the prosecutor faced
a limited budget.
The prosecutor is not the only person who may be willing to help
a defendant circumvent harsh federal sanctions. Jurors may refuse to
convict on state charges triggering deportation and other sanctions
they think are just too harsh. Studies have shown thatjuries are reluc-
tant to convict on charges that trigger the death penalty, 42 despite
various efforts made to keep jurors from voting their consciences. 43
For similar reasons, victims of crime may not press charges, particu-
larly when they would bear some of the hardship caused by the federal
sanctions.4 4
3. Fairness Costs
The previous two sections demonstrated that federal supplemen-
tal sanctions may be inefficient by making state prosecutions more
costly or by diluting deterrence. This section aims to demonstrate
42 Richard 0. Lempcrt, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case
for Capital Punishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 1177, 1210-11 (1981) (discussing evidence that
increased use of death penalty-particularly the mandatory death pcnalty-reduces the
chance of conviction by juries because of reluctance to execute and that this might seri-
ously undermine any deterrent effect of capital punishment).
43 The general rule in both state and federal courts is that neither the judge nor the
attorneys in a case may inform the jury of the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict.
Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing
Consequences, 95 COLUm. L. REv. 1232, 1242 (1995). Indeed, a court may even instruct the
jury not to consider punishment in reaching its verdict. Id. Moreover, although juries
possess a nullification power, in mostjurisdictions neither attorneys nor judges may inform
them of that power. See Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Necessity as
Jury Responses to Crimes oJ Conscience, 69 S. CL. L. R~v. 2039, 2041, 2045 (1996).
44 E.g., Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1498, 1525-26 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence] (noting that prosecu-
tion for domestic violence offenses may impose financial hardship on victims and thus may
make them less willing to press charges); Jo Becker et al., Crimes Often Don't Cost Guards
Their Jobs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1999, at IA ("'We began having problems get-
ting wives or girlfriends to go forward with prosecutions [because of the Lautenberg fire-
arms ban]. . . . Many of them live on state property, so if the wife testifies against a
husband, not only are they losing an income, they are losing their home.'" (quoting Flor-
ida State Attorney Rod Smith)); see also Robin Gaby Fisher, Domestic Violence Group Criticized
Newark Police, STAR-LEDGER (NJ.), Mar. 2, 1999, at 13 (noting that, in 1998, there were only
thirty domestic violence complaints against officers on the Newark police force, compared
to forty-seven in 1997, when the Lautenberg firearms ban was still relatively new).
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that supplemental sanctions may also be unfair because they are often
triggered unevenly.45
Justice demands treating like cases alike. 46 Disparities in sanc-
tions should not be arbitrary; they should serve only legitimate govern-
ment purposes, such as deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation.
47
The fairness of federal sanctions is called into doubt when they are
triggered by some, but not all, similar cases.
To some extent, the uneven application of the sanctions merely
reflects preexisting disparities in the application of state law. When a
state fails to treat like cases alike, the attendant federal sanctions will
not be applied equitably either. By choosing to base federal sanctions
on state convictions, Congress has in effect delegated to the states pri-
mary responsibility for ensuring the fair application of those sanc-
tions. The problem is that the states have fallen short of providing
truly equal treatment under their own laws. 48 Until they do, the fair-
ness of federal sanctions will remain suspect as well.
Rather than repeat claims already made about criminal justice in
the states, the main purpose of this section is to identify overlooked
intrastate and interstate disparities in the application of federal sanc-
tions; these are disparities that do not simply mirror any preexisting
arbitrariness in the application of any one state's criminal law. First,
because federal sanctions affect the way a state handles its criminal
cases, they make it even more likely that similar cases will be treated
differently by the state. Second, by allowing the states to decide which
crimes will trigger federal sanctions, Congress has greatly increased
the likelihood that the sanctions will not be applied evenly across
states. While these issues are important and salient enough to warrant
45 This section does not argue that supplemental sanctions (particularly deportation)
are unfair because they are excessive or because they are applied retroactively. For discus-
sions of those fairness concerns, see Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitu-
tional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771, 773-74 (2000) (claiming that deportation constitutes
excessive "punishment" in some cases), and Anjali Parekh Prakash, Note, Changing the
Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420,
1459-60 (1997) (arguing that constitutional considerations and fairness concerns counsel
against the retroactive application of amendments to deportation law).
46 E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (stating that the defendant's
"punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt" and should
not be identical to that of his co-defendants who were not similarly situated).
47 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.1 (2004) [hereinafter GUIDELINES
MANUAL), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/TABCON04.htm.
48 There is an extensive literature addressing the existence and injustice of disparities
within individual state criminal justice systems. See, e.g., WILLARD. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE:
A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING T14E SYSTEM: THE CON-
TROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 (1993); ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 10.
Part of the problem is that state prosecutors operate largely unchecked. See William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 506-12 (2001)
(pointing out that prosecutors have broad discretion in charging decisions, which has the
effect of creating great disparities in the application of substantive criminal law).
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brief discussion here, this is not meant to be a definitive or compre-
hensive treatment of either matter.
a. Intrastate Disparities
Congress must take state determinations as it finds them, so that
whatever disparities exist under state law will be replicated in the im-
position of federal supplemental sanctions as well. But federal sanc-
tions may do more than replicate state disparities; the sanctions may
exacerbate them by affecting the way state determinations are made.
In some cases, state prosecutors will make decisions without regard to
the federal sanctions or the costs that accompany them. In other
cases, however, prosecutors will adjust their charging practices to cir-
cumvent the sanctions.49 There is no mechanism in place to ensure
that similar cases will be treated similarly in the shadow of federal law.
State prosecutors are neither subject to federal controls, nor are they
trained to handle federal sanctions. They respond to them in an ad
hoc fashion, thus compounding the lack of uniformity in state crimi-
nal proceedings.
To illustrate, consider this simple hypothetical. Able and Baker
are both aliens and each solicits a prostitute for sex in a state that
criminalizes prostitution. For the moment, suppose Congress does
not consider solicitation of prostitution a deportable offense. The two
men are both charged with solicitation, agree to plead guilty, and are
sentenced to one year of probation. Within the state, they have been
treated equitably. However, consider what might have happened had
Congress declared solicitation to be grounds for deportation. Both
men are charged with the crime of solicitation. This time, however,
only Able pleads guilty to it; he is sentenced to one year of probation,
as before, and he is then deported by ICE. Baker, under these new
facts, bargains with the prosecutor and cops a loitering plea instead;
he is sentenced to six months probation, but he gets to remain in the
country because, unlike solicitation of prostitution, loitering is not
considered a deportable offense.
Congress has chosen to rely on state prosecutors to determine
whom it shall sanction. In the hypothetical, the prosecutor exercised
her discretion and gave Baker a better deal than Able, resulting in a
disparity in both the state and federal sanction. Perhaps the prosecu-
tor had more time on her hands to handle Able's case, or perhaps she
failed to discover that the solicitation of prostitution conviction would
get Able deported in time to do anything about it. Or perhaps Baker
could afford to take his case to trial, if necessary, whereas Able could
49 Which path a particular case will follow depends on a variety of factors discussed in
detail in the next section.
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not, and so on. Such facts could explain how the disparity came to be,
but they do not make it less unfair. Able and Baker committed identi-
cal acts in the same state; they could hardly be more similarly situated.
No goal of either state criminal law or of federal immigration law
would seem to justify the disparate outcomes that arise as a result of
the federal sanction.
b. Interstate Disparities
Aside from exacerbating the disparities common within any state,
federal sanctions create peculiar disparities between factually similar
cases arising in different states.50 Return to the version of the hypo-
thetical just given, in which Congress considers soliciting a prostitute a
deportable offense. Suppose that each of our two aliens, Able and
Baker, hires a prostitute for sex, but Able does so in California where
prostitution is a crime, and Baker does so in Nevada where it is not.
Able is apprehended, charged, convicted, and sentenced by state au-
thorities to one year of probation before being deported by ICE.
However, neither Nevada, nor the federal government, takes any ac-
tion against Baker.
In this hypothetical, the sanctions levied by the two state govern-
ments differ, but this disparity is easily justified. Under our federal
system, states have wide latitude to define crimes and their conse-
quences to suit local tastes, subject to certain constitutional limits that
do not apply here. It should thus come as no surprise that the crimi-
nal law differs substantively from state to state. When assessing the
fairness of a sanction a state has imposed in a particular case, it makes
sense to compare that sanction to others the same state has imposed in
other cases. To say otherwise, that Nevada must punish Baker, for
example, or that California must not punish Able, so that both men
are treated the same as a matter of state law, is to deny the premise of
federalism (that each state is autonomous) and one of its most impor-
tant values (the diversity such autonomy entails).51
The interstate disparity in the federal sanction raises more seri-
ous concerns. We expect national laws to have the same meaning and
to be enforced similarly across the nation,5 2 but that cannot happen
50 Another disparity exists because Congress has chosen to limit the sanction to non-
citizen offenders. Suppose Able gets deported because he is an alien, but Baker is not
deported because he is a citizen. There is a discrepancy in the outcomes under federal
law, but Able arguably has not been treated unfairly as a result. The two men may have
committed identical acts, but they are not similarly situated for purposes of immigration
law, the raison d' ,tre of which is to regulate aliens and not citizens.
51 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 401-02 (1997).
52 Indeed, this was one of the reasons that the Framers created the federal court
system and refused to leave federal law entirely in the hands of state judges. See THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The mere neces-
sity of uniformity in the interpretation of national laws, decides the question. Thirteen
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when Congress incorporates state law into the federal code. (It also
cannot happen when Congress relies upon state officials to help en-
force federal law, as demonstrated above.) State laws differ, and those
differences will carry over to congressional statutes that refer to
them. 53 For example, aliens may be deported for having sex with mi-
nors in some states, but not in others;54 drug felons lose their federal
welfare benefits in Alabama, but not in Michigan;"5 and domestic
abusers who participate in pretrial counseling are still subject to prose-
cution (and hence the Lautenberg firearms ban) in Arizona, but not
in Connecticut.56 The effect is that Congress treats the same act dif-
ferently, depending on where it occurs.
The geographic disparity in our hypothetical appears arbitrary at
first, but it may yet serve one of the purposes behind deportation. In
essence, Congress has chosen to tie deportation to what the states
have criminalized, as opposed to what aliens have done. For crimes
that are malum prohibitum, that is, evil only because prohibited, the
emphasis on whether a given state criminalizes the behavior makes
perfect sense. A goal of deportation is to remove dangerous aliens
from the country. The fact that Able hired a prostitute knowing it was
illegal to do so in California indicates that he is dangerous-in the
sense that he is willing to defy the law, regardless of whether his action
independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws,
is a hyrdra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed.").
For judicial decisions extolling the virtues of national uniformity, see, for example,
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1983) ("Whether one has been
'convicted' within the language of the [federal] gun control statutes is necessarily ... a
question of federal, not state, law ... This makes for desirable national uniformity unaf-
fected by varying state laws, procedures, and definitions of 'conviction.'"), and Garcia-Gon-
zales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 1965) ("'It is hardly to be supposed that Congress
intended, in providing for the deportation of aliens convicted of narcotic violations, to
extend preferential treatment to those convicted in the few jurisdictions, which, like Cali-
fornia, provide for the expungement of a record of conviction upon the termination of
probation.'" (quoting In reA-F-, 8 1. & N. Dec. 429, 446 (BIA 1959))).
53 There are many examples of federal law referencing or relying upon state law pro-
visions (as opposed to state determinations). See, e.g., Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1416-17
(9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that "federal law frequently relies on"
state law, citing the bankruptcy code's reliance on state law for determination of rights in a
bankrupt's estate, federal tax law's reliance on state law property systems, and the social
security system's reliance on state law definitions of marriage).
54 Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of
"Aggravated Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1696, 1720-24 (1999) (noting that statu-
tory rape is a deportable offense in some states, but not even criminal in others).
55 See PATRICIA ALLARD, TRE SENTENCING PROJFCT, LIFE SENTFNCES: DENYING WELFARE
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 3 tbl.1 (2002), at http://www.senten
cingproject.org/pdfs/9088.pdf; infra text accompanying notes 195-198.
56 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38c(g) (2004) (providing that charges will be dis-
missed when the batterer completes a counseling program) with ARiz. R v. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3601(I) (West 2004) (authorizing only pretrial release, and not the dismissal of
charges, when the batterer participates in a counseling program).
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was in itself dangerous. The fact that Baker hired a prostitute does
not permit the same inference because he did so in a state that had
not criminalized prostitution.
But for crimes that are malum in se, that is, intrinsically evil, how a
given state characterizes the act is beside the point. Performing the
act itself demonstrates dangerousness, regardless of whether the state
chooses to call the act a crime. If prostitution is malum in se, the pur-
poses of immigration law do not justify the disparate outcomes in the
two cases. Congress would want to deport Baker, even though techni-
cally he has not committed a crime under Nevada law.
It may be that Congress has chosen to sacrifice equal treatment in
such cases to serve other goals. One such goal is respecting states'
rights. To apply federal sanctions uniformly, Congress might need to
federalize all the crimes that trigger the sanctions, an obvious affront
to state power. The problem with this reasoning, however, is that
Congress need not make prostitution or anything else a federal crime
to deport aliens who solicit or engage in it. Deportation like other
supplemental sanctions is not punishment.5 7 A state criminal convic-
tion is just a piece of information, a convenient way of identifying
whom to sanction. Congress could ferret out the same information
through a federal administrative hearing instead. In any event, Con-
gress's recent actions belie any intent to sacrifice uniformity at the
altar of states' rights, at least when it comes to immigration law. 58
It is more likely that Congress has incorporated state law out of
parsimony or convenience.59 Recall that one of the main reasons
Congress ties its sanctions to state determinations is that it saves the
federal government the expense of making those determinations it-
self. To guarantee that all aliens who have committed certain bad acts
are deported, Congress would first need to specify those acts in a fed-
eral code. The executive branch would then have to enforce the law.
All of this would be at tremendous expense to the federal
government.
57 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
("While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as
punishment." (citation omitted)).
58 For example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) clarified that "conviction" is to be defined by federal and not state law for
purposes of deportation. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322(a) (1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
628 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (48) (A)
(1999)). By contrast, Congress continues to allow the states to define "conviction" for
purposes of federal gun bans, rejecting a Supreme Court decision that held to the con-
trary. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000) ("What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be
determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were
held."); infra note 169.
59 Cf RonaldJ. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 289, 291
(1969) (observing that "it seems quite natural for our two legal systems [state and federal]
to borrow from one another, simply as a matter of convenience").
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The point of this section is simply to call attention to the way that
supplemental sanctions are imposed unevenly and cause state sanc-
tions to be imposed unevenly as well. The consequent unfairness is
another cost of the sanctions, but it does not follow that we can or
must do anything about it. To say the least, making federal determi-
nations about who is deportable, who should not carry a firearm, and
so on-without considering any actions taken by the states-would be
costly.
D. Factors Influencing the Net Effect on State Proceedings
This section clarifies when federal sanctions will be imposed and
when they will be circumvented, and also suggests when they will re-
duce, enhance, or leave unchanged the state sanction imposed for
violation of state law. It isolates those characteristics of the sanctions,
state legal systems, and defendants that play a role in determining
what the ultimate effect of any given supplemental sanction will be.
For sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality, the analysis will
focus on how these factors affect plea bargaining. To be sure, sanc-
tions may affect other stages of state criminal proceedings as well.60
Nonetheless, many cases end in pleas, and as a practical matter,
whether a federal sanction is imposed or not is determined at this
stage.
It is no surprise that so many criminal cases end in pleas. In the
usual case, negotiating a plea costs much less than standing trial and
triggers a sanction that, while certain to be imposed, is often lower
than the sanction the defendant would face if he were to stand trial
instead and lose.6' The benefit of the plea bargain to the defendant
equals the difference between the certain punishment triggered by
the plea and the expected punishment triggered by trial, as well as the
difference between the costs of negotiating the plea and standing
trial. The defendant who accepts a plea bargain has presumably done
his math and determined that the plea is the superior option, all
things considered.
60 For example, federal sanctions may give a defendant the incentive to increase
spending at trial, e.g., by hiring a better lawyer or pressing more issues (admissibility of
evidence, etc.). Putting up a more vigorous defense at trial will burden the state. In rare
cases, the federal sanction might convince a defendant not to stand trial and to accept the
first plea offered by the state instead. This might happen when the charge that would be
brought at trial would trigger the sanction, but the charge contained in the plea would not.
Cases like this are rare, however, because only a small fraction of defendants currenty
prefer to stand trial; most already accept the plea offered by the state. See supra Part I.B.
Hence, the states are unlikely to see a drop in trials following adoption of federal sanctions.
61 See WALKER, supra note 48, at 107 (noting that defendants often stand trial on
charges that are more serious than the ones that are offered in plea deals).
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Federal sanctions affect defendants' choice of strategy because
they alter the relative attractiveness of accepting pleas or standing
trial. The graph below illustrates this point, using figures from the
earlier hypothetical involving Jack.
FIGURE 1: EXPECTED COSTS OF TRIAL AND PLEA
$90,000 Robbery Trial
(federal sanction)
$80,000
$70,000
P* Theft Plea
$60,000 - (federal sanction)
$50,000 T*
X $40,000 Robbery Trial
(no federal sanction)
$30,000
$20,000 T
Theft Plea
$10,000 - P (no federal sanction)
Shoplifting Plea
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Chance of guilty verdict at trial
When a federal sanction such as deportation would be triggered
by either plea or trial, it makes trial a relatively more attractive option
for the defendant. The plea still offers a lower state sanction and
lower legal expenses, but it offers no advantage when it comes to the
federal sanction; trial affords the defendant his only chance of escap-
ing that sanction. As shown on the graph, the federal sanction shifts
the cost of the Theft plea upward by a constant amount of $50,000,
regardless of the probability ajury would find Jack guilty of the crime.
If instead Jack stands trial, the federal sanction is only probabilistic: as
long as Jack has some chance of acquittal, the expected cost of the
Robbery trial will increase by less than $50,000. 6 2 Hence, even a Rob-
bery trial is more appealing than the Theft plea, as long as Jack has
some chance-here, at least 30%-of being acquitted by the jury.
Only when Jack's probability of being convicted reaches 70% does the
62 Figure 1 illustrates the disparity in the effect of the sanction when the probability of
conviction at trial is 50%. At that point on the horizontal axis, the federal sanction in-
creases the cost of the Theft plea by $50,000 from P to P* and increases the cost of the
Robbery trial by a lesser amount, $25,000, from T to T*. To keep the graph clear, none of
the points are exactly above the 50% point on the axis.
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total cost of the Robbery trial exceed that of the Theft plea. The fed-
eral sanctions will not always tip the scales in favor of going to trial,
but in some cases, the sanctions will eliminate the benefits of the plea
bargain (lower state sanction and lower legal fees) that the state would
prefer to offer.
1. Federal Factors Bearing on the Net Effect of Supplemental
Sanctions
a. Magnitude of the Federal Sanction
Simply put, the more severe the supplemental sanction, the more
resistance it is likely to provoke. Threatening to deport a defendant
accused of theft, for example, will spark considerably more marginal
resistance from that defendant than would, say, imposing an addi-
tional fine of $100. It makes little sense to spend large sums on legal
services to avoid such petty consequences. Deportation is another
matter altogether.
To be more precise, it is the relative magnitude of the federal
sanction that matters most. The federal sanction must be compared
to both the cost of an additional unit of resistance and the size of the
sanction the state itself will impose. The federal sanction will not pro-
voke more resistance unless the cost of such resistance is less than its
expected benefits. To illustrate, Jack from the earlier hypothetical
must spend $9,000 more on legal services to take his case to trial. In
addition, the state's threat to charge him with a more serious crime at
trial adds an expected $7,500 to the cost of that option. But spending
$16,500 on a 50% chance at acquittal still makes sense for Jack when
deportation costs more than twice that amount. But if Congress were
to reduce its sanction, say, by shortening the term before which Jack
may reenter the country, going to trial may no longer make sense for
him. Suppose Jack now considers deportation the equivalent of a
$5,000 fine as opposed to a $50,000 fine. This smaller fine is not sig-
nificant enough to make him press his luck at trial. To be sure, the
cost of accepting a plea to Theft has gone up by $5,000 (to $16,000
total), but it is still lower than the total cost of going to trial, $25,000.
In theory, even a small increase in the sanction should result in some
(marginal) increase in spending on defense. In practice, however,
spending on defense may come in large lumps, thereby requiring sig-
nificant increases in the sanction for additional spending to make
sense.
The federal sanction must be compared to the state sanction as
well. One reason this comparison matters is that a defendant who
faces grave state charges (e.g., murder) might exhaust his wealth to
avoid the state sanction alone. For example, threatening to strip a
convicted felon of the right to possess a firearm is unlikely to change
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the posture of a defendant facing capital murder charges in a state
proceeding. The firearms ban certainly adds to the overall sanction,
but such a defendant would have already committed himself to doing
everything possible to reduce his chance of conviction. Or suppose
that Jack in our hypothetical is suspected of Rape, and not Theft or
Robbery. Rape, like the other crimes, triggers the deportation sanc-
tion, but the rape charge carries a much more severe state penalty of
$50,000, compared to $10,000 for Theft and $25,000 for Robbery.
The federal sanction would not change Jack's strategy. He would pro-
ceed to trial regardless because the state sanction by itself is of suffi-
cient magnitude to justify the expense of trial (assuming he still has a
50% chance of acquittal).
The discrepancy between the federal and state sanction is also
important because it determines whether the state can offset the fed-
eral sanction through sentence bargaining. In theory, the state could
offer to reduce its own sanction up to the amount of the federal sanc-
tion, and thereby cancel out any effect the federal sanction might
have on the defendant's bargaining position. Suppose that deporta-
tion would costJack only $25,000. Further suppose that the state sanc-
tions remain the same as in the original version of the hypothetical,
only now those sanctions are only guidelines and are not binding
upon the state courts. The federal sanction still makes Jack prefer
trial over a plea to either Theft or Robbery. But to avoid trial, the
state could offer to waive the state sanction of $10,000, leaving Jack
worse off than he was before the federal sanction yet still preferring to
plead. 63 Nonetheless, in practice, sentence bargaining of this sort is
not a viable option for the states. For one thing, the federal sanction
often far exceeds the state one, meaning the state can mitigate but not
eliminate the impact of the supplemental sanction. Further, many ju-
risdictions have mandatory sentencing policies that prohibit sentence
bargaining of this sort.64 In any event, state politicians (including dis-
trict attorneys, who are elected) may balk at reducing state sanctions
out of fear of appearing soft on crime to their constituents. In the
voters' minds, the fact that someone else is punishing state criminals
does not relieve the state of its responsibility to do so as well.
63 In this variation of the hypothetical, the Robbery trial would cost Jack an expected
$35,000 (.5 * [$25,000 + $25,000] + $10,000), but the Theft plea would cost hin $36,000
without the state's concession on penalties ($25,000 + $10,000 + $1,000). Including the
state's concession on its own sanction, the total cost of the Theft plea is only $26,000
($25,000 + $1,000), which is more than the total sanction that would have been imposed
without any federal sanction, $11,000, but still less than the cost of going to trial.
64 See Marc Mauer, Why Are Thugh on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 SrAN. L. & POLY
REv. 9, 11 (1999) (reporting that "every state ... has some type of mandatory sentencing
law").
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State prosecutors may also be unwilling to help the federal gov-
ernment execute a sanction they feel is unduly harsh. When the fed-
eral sanction is significantly larger than what state prosecutors are
used to imposing for a given crime, they will be more inclined to con-
sider it unjust. As discussed above, prosecutors are bound to seekjus-
tice, not convictions; they may feel justice is better served by letting a
defendant off the hook entirely rather than by making him suffer out
of proportion to his crime.
Many of the federal supplemental sanctions that exist today
greatly exceed the punishment that may be inflicted under state law.
Deportation is a compelling example, with devastating consequences
for many deported aliens.65 Aside from losing the lives they have
made for themselves in this country, deported aliens may be forced to
return to a country that is entirely unfamiliar to them or where they
may face oppression and torture, as well as the more mundane obsta-
cles of repatriation. All of these hardships can be triggered by com-
mitting crimes that are often treated leniently (perhaps too much so)
by the states. 66 The Lautenberg firearms ban may strike some as in-
consequential, but it is a particularly severe sanction for convicted do-
mestic abusers whose jobs require possession of a firearm, including
police officers, prison guards, and military personnel. 67 There is no
work-related exception to the ban, so for these people it amounts to
the loss of a career as well. 68 Like deportation, the federal ban is se-
vere in comparison to the relatively light sanction that is often im-
posed by states in domestic abuse cases. 6" We will see below in the
detailed case studies of five federal sanctions that the most severe ones
do, in fact, have the most deleterious effect on state proceedings.
65 See, e.g., Pilcher, supra note 33, at 333. For a detailed discussion of the deportation
sanction, see infra Part II.A.
66 Cases involving drastic disparities in the sanctions are not difficult to find. E.g.,
Michael Sangiacomo, Immigrant Contesting Deportation; Spouse Abuse Plea Could Return Him to
Yemen, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 17, 1999, at 1-B (discussing an immigrant who was
ordered deported to Yemen, where he would be separated from his American wife and two
children, because of a no-contest plea to a domestic violence charge); Patrick Smikle, IN-
TrER PRESS SERV., Rights-US.: Immigrants Face Deportation for Minor Offenses (Apr. 29, 1999)
(describing the story of a Nigerian immigrant who was ordered deported after pleading
guilty to shoplifting $14.99 in baby clothes, a crime for which the state had imposed a one-
year suspended sentence and a fine of $360).
67 See Kerri Fredheim, Comment, Closing the Loopholes in Domestic Violence Laws: The
Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9), 19 PACE L. REv. 445, 504 (1999).
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
c9 See 142 CONG. Rc. SI1,876 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frank
Lautenberg) (noting that most domestic violence offenders plead down to a misdemeanor
and get away with only a "slap on the wrist").
HeinOnline  -- 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1437 2004-2005
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
b. Emphasis on State Determinations
The expected cost to the defendant also depends upon the likeli-
hood a federal sanction will be imposed, given a state determina-
tion.70 Congress could make the imposition of a federal sanction
depend on a multitude of considerations, a state conviction being
only one of them. Putting more emphasis upon the state conviction-
for example, by making it, standing alone, sufficient to trigger a sanc-
tion-naturally draws more attention to the state's criminal proceed-
ings. The more emphasis that is placed on the state proceeding, the
more resources the defendant will commit to that proceeding. 71
To illustrate how the emphasis on state convictions affects the de-
fendant's strategy in the state case, return to the original hypothetical
involving Jack. In it, we assumed Jack had no opportunity to escape
deportation if convicted of a felony such as Theft or Robbery. Jack
thus insisted on trial or a plea deal to Shoplifting. Now suppose in-
stead that Congress has ordered that immigration judges must con-
sider one other fact besides conviction-call it the defendant's "life
story"-in deciding whether to deport an alien. An alien never knows
for certain whether his life story will be sufficiently compelling to con-
vince the judge not to order deportation, but he does know that a
certain fraction of criminal aliens escape deportation this way. For
this hypothetical, let us suppose that fraction is two-thirds. Jack will
plead guilty to Theft and take his chances before the immigration
judge. The nominal sanction has not changed from the original hy-
pothetical, but now there is only a chance it will be triggered if Jack
accepts the Theft plea. The total expected cost of the plea is $27,667,
which is less than the total expected cost if Jack were instead to go to
trial and then tell his story to the judge if convicted, $30,833.72
70 It also depends upon the probability of conviction if the defendant stands trial, as
discussed below in Part I.D.3.
71 See Pilcher, supra note 33, at 288 (noting that, by mandating automatic deportation
for aliens convicted of certain crimes and by narrowing the opportunities to appeal a de-
portation order, federal immigration law shifts all attention to the criminal proceedings).
It is worth noting, however, that incorporating a state law into the federal code does not
burden states in the same way. For example, when the federal government makes it a
federal crime to violate a state law, it also assumes some of the burden of enforcing the law,
and thus confers a benefit on the state. Cf Samuel Mermin, "Cooperative Federalism" Again:
State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I,
57 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.5 (1947) (noting that state efforts to prosecute violators of federal law in
state court-under state laws incorporating federal law-save the federal government the
expense of prosecuting such violators itself).
72 The cost of the plea includes the deportation sanction discounted by the
probability of leniency (1/3 * $50,000), in addition to the state sanction for Theft
($10,000) and the cost of negotiating the plea ($1,000). The cost of going to trial includes
the deportation sanction discounted by both the probability of acquittal and the
probability of leniency (1/2 * 1/3 * $50,000), in addition to the state sanction for Robbery
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Today, federal sanctions frequently attach automatically as a re-
sult of a state conviction. 73 That is, there is no fact other than the
existence of a state conviction the federal government must prove to
execute the sanction. For example, the Lautenberg firearms ban at-
taches immediately upon conviction for a misdemeanor crime of do-
mestic violence, and there is nothing that the convicted abuser can do
outside the state system to lift the ban. 74 Likewise, an alien has very
little chance of escaping deportation once he is convicted of a deport-
able offense. While ICE must still give some criminal aliens a hearing
before deporting them, its authority to grant reprieve has been nar-
rowly circumscribed. 75 The hearing, in other words, is a formality. A
student convicted of a drug offense becomes ineligible to receive fed-
eral financial aid for at least one year.76 While she may regain her
eligibility earlier by completing a rehabilitation program, it would
often make more sense to simply wait out the ban.
77
It is hardly necessary to make the imposition of a federal sanction
hinge upon the fact of conviction and nothing else. There are alter-
natives. Congress urges federally funded public housing authorities to
consider all the circumstances, and not just a criminal conviction,
before deciding to evict a tenant. 78 Prior to 1990, state judges could
bar the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from deporting
an alien on the basis of a state criminal conviction. 7 Prior to 1996,
the attorney general could waive deportation for criminal aliens
under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
based on a variety of considerations, including the seriousness of the
offense, evidence of postconviction rehabilitation, duration of the
alien's residence, impact of deportation on the alien's family, and ser-
vice in the U.S. Armed Forces. 80 Similarly, Congress has authorized
the Treasury Department to grant waivers from federal firearms bans,
though it has never provided the necessary funding to execute the
discounted by the probability of acquittal (1/2 * $25,000) and the cost of litigating the case
($10,000).
7- It does not follow that these federal sanctions will be imposed following every quali-
fying conviction. Ensuring that all criminal aliens are deported, that all convicted abusers
relinquish their firearms, and that all drug offenders are denied federal aid can be a tricky
task. There are ways to defeat federal sanctions without troubling the state. For example,
students can simply deny prior drug convictions on their FAFSA forms. See supra note 26.
74 See infra notes 158-159.
75 For a thorough discussion of the prospects of evading the deportation sanction
postconviction, see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
76 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2000).
77 See id. § 1091(r)(2).
78 See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(0(5) (vii) (2004).
79 See infta note 122.
80 See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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authority."' The point is that Congress need not focus exclusively on
the existence of state convictions in levying its sanctions.
To be sure, there is an obvious reason that Congress prefers a
simpler approach. Expanding the range of facts to consider before
executing a sanction can be costly if the federal government must do
the considering. Requiring an immigration judge to consider a crimi-
nal alien's life story adds complexity and cost to the otherwise simple
deportation hearing. However, the amount Congress saves by simpli-
fying the sanctions could easily be eclipsed by the costs that automatic
sanctions impose on the states. The cost savings to Congress are, in a
sense, illusory.
c. Breadth of the Federal Sanction
The relative magnitude of a federal sanction and the probability
that it will be imposed given a state conviction help determine how
the defendant will respond to a particular state charge. The breadth
of the sanction determines how difficult it will be for the prosecutor to
circumvent it.82 For example, when Congress specifies that conviction
of "any felony" will trigger deportation, the prosecutor must charge a
defendant with a misdemeanor or otherwise stop short of convicting
him to avoid imposition of the sanction. The federal sanction would
be narrower if it applied to some felonies, such as Robbery, but not
others, such as Theft. In that case, Jack would plead guilty to Theft
and his state case would not be affected by the additional sanction.
Conversely, the federal sanction would be broader still if it applied to
"any offense having as an element the taking of property without the
owner's consent," regardless of whether the state considered it to be a
felony or a misdemeanor. Under this regime, even if he were given
the opportunity to enter a Shoplifting plea, Jack would prefer to stand
trial instead, because the plea no longer shields him from the federal
sanction.
Generally speaking, federal supplemental sanctions are quite
broad. For example, the Lautenberg firearms ban is triggered by a
conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, which in-
cludes any offense that has as an element the use or threatened use of
physical force against a spouse, child, or someone similarly situated. 8a
Thus, charges ranging from simple battery to stalking will trigger the
81 See infra notes 158-59.
82 A sanction is broad when a wide range of crimes or outcomes trigger it. Broad
sanctions cost more for the prosecutor to circumvent using charge bargaining and similar
tactics, and hence carry higher circumvention costs. The effect of breadth on the
probability of circumvention is less certain. Prosecutors facing limited budgets may have
no choice but to circumvent, while those with more resources may he less inclined to cir-
cumvent when the costs are high.
83 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 (a) (33) (A), 922(g) (9) (2000).
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ban. In immigration law, a wide range of offenses could trigger de-
portation, including, among others, aggravated felonies, crimes of
moral turpitude, and almost any drug offense.8 4 Further, deportation
is triggered by a wide range of outcomes that fall short of what the
state might consider to be a conviction. An alien may be deported if
the record of his state case reveals facts sufficient to support a finding
of guilty of a deportable offense, whether or not the state has actually
found him guilty of such an offense.8 5
The allure of broad sanctions is apparent. Because the federal
government cannot control state prosecutors directly, it must find an-
other way to ensure that states do not thwart congressional aims by
circumventing the sanctions. Broadening the sanctions makes them
more difficult to avoid. Hence, Congress thought it could stop state
prosecutors from skirting the Gun Control Act in domestic abuse
cases by extending the firearms prohibition to misdemeanor crimes as
well as felonies. 86 Of course, making it more difficult for states to cir-
cumvent a sanction does not necessarily stop them from doing so. In-
deed, if the ploy does not work-that is, if states continue to
circumvent the sanctions after they are broadened-it will only mag-
nify circumvention costs, since states will have to make even bigger
concessions with defendants to get around the federal sanctions.
Moreover, broader sanctions are bound to be imposed upon some
individuals whom Congress might prefer not to sanction, all things
considered.
2. State Factors
The actions of state officials trigger federal sanctions; thus, the
characteristics of those officials and the legal systems in which they
operate influence how they will respond to the sanctions. The most
important of these attributes is the amount of resources state prosecu-
tors have to respond to the aggressive tactics used by defendants wish-
ing to avoid the federal consequences of state convictions. The more
resources a prosecutor has to devote to a case, the greater her bargain-
ing power. She may stand pat and refuse to compromise the state
charge, even if it means taking the case to trial. Implementation costs
will be high, but circumvention costs will generally be low. By compar-
ison, a prosecutor with limited resources cannot afford even a modest
increase in trials. She has less bargaining power and must compro-
mise with a defendant who refuses to accept any plea that triggers the
84 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
85 See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48) (A) (1999).
86 142 CONG. REc. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
("This amendment would close this dangerous loophole and keep guns away from violent
individuals who threaten their own families ... ").
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federal sanction. In sum, a prosecutor cannot avoid the costs of sup-
plemental sanctions altogether; however, depending on the amount
of resources she has at her disposal, she can determine whether those
costs come in the form of more trials (implementations costs) or re-
duced deterrence and consistency in sanctioning (circumvention and
fairness costs).
The flexibility of the state legal system also influences the effect
of federal sanctions. Flexibility is the state law analog to the breadth
of federal sanctions. In this context, it refers to the ability of prosecu-
tors to charge a variety of crimes to punish a certain act. 87 For exam-
ple, if the conduct at issue violates several state laws carrying identical
state sanctions, it may be possible (depending on the breadth of the
federal sanction) for the state prosecutor to charge a defendant with a
crime that does not trigger the federal sanction, without compromis-
ing the state sanction in the process. The federal sanction would thus
affect only the nomenclature of the charge brought by the state and
not the sanction imposed by it. However, some federal sanctions are
so broad that they make circumvention difficult, no matter how flexi-
ble the state system. Further, state "no-drop arrest" and mandatory
sentencing policies restrict flexibility and interfere with the ability of
prosecutors to negotiate around federal as well as state sanctions.
The last state factor can best be described as the attitudes held by
various participants in the criminal justice system, including police,
prosecutors, judges, juries, witnesses, and even crime victims. This
concept includes the empathy these parties might feel towards de-
fendants facing federal sanctions that appear out of proportion to the
crime involved. A police officer might overlook the marijuana he
finds in a student's backpack because the student could lose his col-
lege aid eligibility; a prosecutor might reduce charges against a cop
accused of beating his wife because he might otherwise lose his job; or
a jury might refuse to convict an immigrant of a crime that will get
him deported and separate him from his family.88 But this concept
also encompasses the biases that make state officials reluctant to pur-
87 Professor Stuntz suggests that prosecutors have enough flexibility to reach their
preferred outcomes in most criminal cases, but he does not consider collateral conse-
quences in his analysis. See Stuntz, supra note 48, at 507-11.
88 In one case, a Michigan prosecutor agreed to offer a young immigrant who had
raped his twelve-year-old sister a lesser charge to stave off deportation and keep his entire
family in the U.S. See Schabath, supra note 37.
In California, juries have refused to convict defendants charged with minor crimes
that will put them away for life because of the state's three-strikes law. See Three-Strikes Law
Makes Some Juries Reluctant to Convict, OREGONIAN, May 26, 1996, at A21 (reporting that a
mistrial was declared when jurors recanted a guilty verdict after hearing that the defendant
would be sentenced to 25 years to life for possessing .07 grams of cocaine); see also
Lempert, supra note 42 (discussing evidence that juries are less likely to convict when the
sentence is death).
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sue some crimes, such as domestic violence.8 9 Federal sanctions like
the Lautenberg firearms ban merely treat the symptoms of such bi-
ases, a strategy that may backfire when the biases remain to help
thwart the sanctions.90
3. Defendant Factors
Each of the foregoing factors affects the attractiveness of the de-
fendant's options (accepting a plea, going to trial, etc.) and may trans-
form an otherwise inferior strategy into a superior one. How the
defendant actually responds to federal sanctions will also depend
upon his wealth and the strength of his case. More than any other
characteristic of the defendant, his wealth determines how much he
will contest the state's case against him. Wealth here includes not
only the defendant's personal fortune, but also any free legal repre-
sentation to which he may have access by grace or right. Wealth mat-
ters because trials are costly affairs.91 The defendant must be able to
afford trial before he can walk away from a plea bargain. In our origi-
nal hypothetical, trial makes sense for Jack. The benefits exceed the
costs, even though they are large. If he can afford trial, Jack can re-
fuse the Theft plea and put pressure on the prosecutor to make a
better offer. But if Jack cannot muster $9,000, he must throw himself
on the mercy of the prosecutor or else take the Theft plea.9 2 We will
see below in Part II.C that federal sanctions that routinely apply to
financially strapped persons are seldom fought in state criminal cases.
The strength of the government's case against the defendant also
affects the attractiveness of trial. A rational defendant with no chance
of being exonerated at trial has no reason to press his case there. Do-
ing so only wastes money and possibly adds to the state sanction since
the state may press more serious charges against a recalcitrant defen-
89 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (noting the government's
argument that a pervasive bias in state justice systems leads to "unacceptably lenient pun-
ishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence").
90 Cf Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 629-40 (2000) (noting that bold law reforms tend to be resisted by the
actors who implement them, whereas modest reforms are more likely to change underly-
ing attitudes over time). The Lautenberg firearms ban, for example, makes police even
more reluctant to charge their own ranks with domestic violence. See Shirley Ragsdale,
Domestic Abuse Punishable Especially ifit's a Policeman, ARrus LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Feb.
27, 2000, at 14B ("The Lautenberg Act upped the ante-giving officers and departments
another reason to keep the dirty secret.").
91 Nonetheless, even a poor defendant who cannot afford to press his case at trial
might be able to take a few other, less costly steps to reduce his chances of conviction (such
as filing a motion to dismiss the charge).
92 Jack could get a public defender to go to trial for him (he cannot be forced to
accept the plea), but the public defender may be unwilling or unable to give jack's case the
same attention a well-paid private attorney might. See generally Robert J. Aalberts et al.,
Public Dejender's Conundrum: Signaling Professionalism and Quality in the Absence of Price, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 525, 528-31 (2002) (discussing client perceptions of public defenders).
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dant. However, the higher the defendant's chances of succeeding at
trial, the more likely he is to seek trial and the better the bargain he
will be able to strike with the prosecutor.
Predicting the precise effects of any specific supplemental sanc-
tion is beyond the scope of this Article. The main point of this analy-
sis is to show that it is naive to think that the federal sanctions will
always be imposed while leaving state determinations unaffected. The
federal sanctions may not be imposed and the state sanction may be
reduced in some cases. Or the sanctions may be imposed but the state
may incur additional expenses in enforcing its laws. The states have
some control over the effects of the federal sanctions, but that control
is limited by the design of the federal sanctions, the substance of state
law, state spending, and the attitudes of various participants in the
state legal systems. The next Part develops case studies of five supple-
mental sanction regimes and draws upon evidence of their effects to
test the theories put forth above.
II
FIVE FEDERAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATE CONVICTION
This Part applies the foregoing analysis to five real-world exam-
ples of supplemental sanctions: the criminal alien deportation provi-
sions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act; the Lautenberg
Amendment to the Gun Control Act; and federal laws restricting eligi-
bility to receive welfare benefits, public housing, and student financial
aid. These laws demonstrate several of the key points made in the
prior Part and, because they were all recently enacted or modified,
they allow for comparisons to be made between the pre- and post-
sanction regimes. Each case study begins by providing background
information regarding how the federal sanction works and the pur-
poses behind it. It then draws from the arguments put forth above to
evaluate the actual effects of the sanction.
A. The Deportation Provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act
Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, aliens may be de-
ported for a wide range of crimes frequently prosecuted by state au-
thorities, including drug crimes, crimes of moral turpitude,
aggravated felonies, crimes of domestic violence, and firearms of-
fenses.95 In 2003 alone, more than 67,000 aliens were deported for
93 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (1999). The definitions of the offense types overlap to a
degree, such that a given crime could fall into more than one category. The INA imas
amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, and IIRIRA, supra note 58. These amendments made more types of
state dispositions count as "convictions" for deportation purposes, increased the number of
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having committed one or more of these five types of crimes, and the
bulk of these cases were undoubtedly handled by the states.94 Figure
2 below depicts all criminal alien deportations by year.
9 5
crimes triggering deportation, applied the changes to cases that predated the amend-
ments, and eliminated most statutory means of relief. See Michael D. Patrick, The Conse-
quences of Criminal Behavior, N.Y.LJ., July 27, 1998, at 3.
94 The government tracks deportations by categories that correspond roughly to
these crime types. In fiscal year 2003, the government deported a total of 79,395 criminal
aliens. OFFCE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 150. Of these, 11,413 deporta-
tions were triggered by violations of immigration laws, id., and were omitted from the total
given in the text above because they were presumably handled by federal authorities. An-
other 31,352 aliens were deported for drug crimes, and 22,167 aliens were deported for
crimes that qualify as either aggravated felonies or crimes of moral turpitude: assault, bur-
glary, robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, sexual assault, and other sex offenses. See id. Crimes
of domestic violence accounted for 2,238 deportations. See id. The remaining 12,225 de-
portations were not categorized by crime type in 2003, id., but they would likely be consid-
ered aggravated felonies or crimes of moral turpitude based on statistics available in earlier
years. See sources cited infra note 95.
Given that so many deportations are triggered by crimes primarily-if not exclu-
sively-handled by the states, we may infer that most deportations are likewise triggered by
state, as opposed to federal, criminal prosecutions. See DUROSE & LANGAN, supra note 4, at
3 tbl. (reporting that only 5.7% of all felony convictions occurred in federal courts in
2002). Table 2 below compares felony convictions in state and federal courts for 2002 by
offense type (the same data are not available for misdemeanor convictions).
TABLE 2: FELONY CoNvicrIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 2002
Felony convictions
Federal as
Offense of conviction State Federal percent of total
Violent offenses 197,030 2,577 1.3%
Murder 8,990 274 3.0%
Sexual assault 35,500 313 0.9%
Robbery 38,430 1,591 4.0%
Aggravated assault 95,600 271 0.3%
Other violent offense 18,510 128 0.7%
Property offenses 325,200 12,686 3.8%
Burglary 100,640 49 0.0%
Larceny 124,320 1,530 1.2%
Fraud 100,240 11,107 10.0%
Drug offenses 340,330 26,234 7.2%
Weapon offenses 32,470 5,563 14.6%
Other offenses 155,970 16,157 9.4%
All offenses 1,051,000 63,217 5.7%
Id. Further evidence that the states handle a large portion of the cases triggering deporta-
tion comes from the fact that nearly 100,000 deportable criminal aliens were being held in
state prisons in 1997, and thus, presumably, had been convicted of state crimes, whereas
less than 30,000 deportable criminal aliens were being held in federal prisons. See Schuck
& Williams, supra note 27, at 381 tbl.1.
95 The statistics are provided by the INS and the Office of Immigration Statistics
within the Department of Homeland Security. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra
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FIGURE 2: CRIMINAL ALIENS DEPORTED FOR NON-IMMIGRATION CRIMES
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Data for 1996 and prior years include deportations for immigration crimes as well.
The first three offense categories account for the vast majority of
those deportations.
Drug crimes alone account for nearly half of all criminal alien
deportations. 96 Conviction for almost any drug crime, no matter how
minor, is grounds for deportation. Indeed, the only drug crime which
will not trigger deportation is the possession of thirty grams or less of
marijuana for personal use.9 7
Crimes of moral turpitude are crimes which are "per se morally
reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se,"98 and for
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. 9 While the
definition obviously includes many serious crimes, even minor of-
fenses like jumping a turnstile on the New York City subway system or
passing a bad check in Georgia are considered crimes of moral turpi-
tude.100 The INA does not distinguish among cases involving the
note 3, at 150; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 177 (2003); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE 236 (2003); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 235 (2002);
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 204 (2002); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZA-
TION SFR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 203-04 (2000); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
167 (1999); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., supra note 6, at 171.
96 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 150 (reporting 31,352 deporta-
tions based on drug convictions out of 79,395 total criminal deportations in 2003).
97 See8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B).
98 In re Fualaau, 21 1. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 1996).
99 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (2) (A) (i).
100 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1941 (2000) (jumping a turnstile);
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same offense type, even though the state might; as long as the state
could punish a given crime with one year or more of prison time, every
conviction constitutes a deportable offense subject to one of two con-
ditions. Conviction for just one crime of moral turpitude is grounds
for deportation if it occurs within five years of the alien's last entry
into the United States; otherwise, two unrelated convictions are
required.' 0 1
The definition of aggravated felony covers many of the same of-
fenses, like murder; rape; sexual abuse of a minor; crimes of violence,
theft, or burglary when a one-year prison term has been imposed; and
fraud or deceit when the loss exceeds $10,000.102 It also captures
some crimes one might not consider "intrinsically wrong," like shop-
lifting, simple battery, petty larceny,10 3 and (until recently) driving
under the influence.10 4 Deportation is virtually assured following con-
viction for an aggravated felony because aggravated felons are pre-
cluded from seeking almost every form of discretionary relief, such as
cancellation of removal. 10 5
Crimes of domestic violence include violent crimes perpetrated
against a spouse or child or anyone similarly situated, as well as related
crimes such as stalking and violation of a protective order. 1° 6 A de-
portable firearms offense is any crime involving the purchase, sale,
exchange, possession, use, ownership, or carrying of any firearm. 10
7
This includes, for example, negligently discharging a firearm in viola-
tion of the California state penal code.' 0 8 Commission of just one do-
mestic violence or firearms offense renders an alien deportable.' 0 9
Pilcher, supra note 33, at 312-13 (passing bad checks). For a detailed description of
"crimes involving moral turpitude," see DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMI-
GRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 6.2-.6 (Ann Block, updating ed., 2004).
1o 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2) (A) (i)-(ii).
102 See id. § 1101(a)(43).
103 See id. § 1101(a) (43) (F) (stating that any crime of violence-one that involves phys-
ical force-carrying a one-year sentence is an aggravated felony); United States v. Graham,
169 F.3d 787, 791-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that misdemeanor petty theft with a one-
year sentence is an aggravated felony); Morawetz, supra note 100, at 1939 ("[A] conviction
for simple battery or for shoplifting ... can be deemed an aggravated felony." (footnotes
omitted)).
104 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S ...... 125 S. Ct. 377, 383-84 (2004) (abrogating
Le v. U.S. Attorney General, 196 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999), which had held that
"driving under the influence with serious bodily injury" was a crime of violence and hence
an aggravated felony).
105 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (v) (authorizing waiver only for presidential or guber-
natorial pardons); see also KSSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 100, at § 9.13 (discuss-
ing cancellation of removal generally).
106 See8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E).
107 Id. at § 1227 (a)(2)(C).
108 See KESSFLBEENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 100, § 7.47.
109 See supra notes 106-108.
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Congress has ordered the deportation of aliens who commit such
crimes for two distinct reasons. First, deportation might serve to
maintain public support for immigratidn more generally."0 Second,
some claim Congress uses deportation to deter immigrants from com-
mitting crimes and to incapacitate the ones who cannot be de-
terred."' t In other words, deportation 'might have more to do with
crime control than with immigration policy. Certainly, the mere
threat of deportation must deter some aliens from committing deport-
able offenses. After all, deportation is a heavy price to pay for break-
ing the law. The problem is that many aliens do not realize that
committing certain crimes will get them deported. 12 This lack of
awareness stems from language barriers, lack of familiarity with the
U.S. legal system, the complexity of immigration law, variations in
state law, lack of training among state prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, and surprise that such a severe sanction could be imposed for
some relatively minor crimes like shoplifting or check fraud. While it
may not deter many aliens from committing crimes, deportation does
at least prevent criminal aliens from committing more crimes in this
country. The idea is that criminal aliens are dangerous, but if they
can be removed from this country, they will "no longer [be a] part of
our crime problem."'11 When the United States deports criminal
aliens, this country no longer bears the costs of recidivism, and the
states no longer bear the costs of investigating, prosecuting, and incar-
cerating repeat alien offenders.' 14
Deportation is such a severe sanction that it often overshadows
the punishment the states threaten to impose. Many criminal aliens
have lived here for years, and when they are removed from this coun-
try, they lose their jobs, are separated from friends and family who
remain behind, and sometimes face oppression and torture in their
110 See Kanstroom, supra note 9, at 1892.
111 See id.
112 We know this because so many aliens seek to withdraw guilty pleas made in state
criminal cases on the grounds that they were unaware the plea would trigger deportation.
See cases cited infra note 129.
113 Kanstroom, supra note 9, at 1893. Indeed, the agency responsible for removing
aliens considers incapacitation to be its primary mission. See Office of Detention & Re-
moval, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Detention and Removal Operations (defining mission as
promoting public safety and national security through deportation of removable aliens), at
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/dro/index.hun (last modified May 5, 2005).
114 Some commentators estimate that it costs $6.5 billion annually to prosecute and
incarcerate all the aliens who commit crimes in the U.S. See Schuck & Williams, supra note
27, at 383.
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homelands.' 5 In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, deportation
can "deprive a man 'of all that makes life worth living."'"1 6
Depending on the crime for which the alien is charged, the dis-
parity in the federal and state sanctions could be enormous. 711  For
example, in one case, a Nigerian immigrant was ordered deported for
shoplifting $14.99 worth of baby clothes. The mother of two had been
given a one-year suspended sentence and fined $360 by the state. The
INS, however, considered this an aggravated felony.'1 8 State courts
readily acknowledge the significant role deportation plays in criminal
cases, for it is relevant in deciding whether guilty pleas entered by
aliens are truly informed. As the Comments to the Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure point out, "The consequences of [immigra-
tion] proceedings will often be more severe and more important to
the non-citizen defendant than the consequences of the criminal pro-
ceedings."'1 9 Whether a state should treat a given crime more seri-
ously is beside the point. For present purposes, what matters is how
states actually treat the crime. When they treat it lenie-tly, for exam-
ple, by imposing light or deferred sentences, and the federal govern-
ment nonetheless deports the alien, the threat of deportation will
loom large over the states' cases.
Once an alien is convicted, deportation is virtually certain to fol-
low. The federal government will detain the alien upon learning of
the conviction or once the alien has finished serving his sentence. 20
115 As Professor Pilcher writes:
Consider, for example, the alien who arrived in the United States as an
infant. Commission of a single criminal offense may mean permanent sepa-
ration from his home and family, and banishment to a country where he
does not speak the language and has no real connections. The law provides
no means by which he may earn an opportunity to return. Or consider the
alien who will, upon deportation, face certain physical torture on account
of his religious beliefs, or whose U.S. citizen daughter will be deprived of
access to medical care for a life-threatening illness.
Pilcher, supra note 33, at 281; see also Morawetz, supra note 100, at 1938 ("Congress has
mandated the deportation of persons whose family members may all reside in this country,
who may have grown up here, who may be needed for the emotional and financial support
of minor children or elderly parents, or who may present other compelling equities that
counsel against deportation.").
116 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922)).
117 See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL Law 162 (1996) ("Deportation has a far harsher impact on most resi-
dent aliens than many conceded 'punishment[s].'"), quoted in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 498 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
118 Smikle, supra note 66; see also Sangiacomo, supra note 66 (discussing an immigrant
who was ordered deported to Yemen, where he would be separated from his American wife
and two children, because of a no-contest plea to a domestic violence charge).
119 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15 cmt.
120 Federal law makes certain that criminal aliens are detained upon conviction or
upon their release from prison. Since 1990, Congress has required states to promptly no-
tify the INS (now ICE) of the criminal conviction of a noncitizen in order to receive federal
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The alien may be given a removal hearing and the opportunity for
appeal, 21 but the Office of Detention and Removal has very little au-
thority to stop the deportation)122 As mentioned previously, aggra-
vated felons are ineligible for all forms of relief, except a pardon from
a governor (or the President, in the case of a federal conviction)., 23
With few exceptions, all other convicted aliens qualify for cancellation
of removal only if they meet three stringent conditions: (1) continu-
ous presence in the United States for ten years or more, (2) good
moral character during that time, and (3) removal would result in
"extremely unusual hardship" to a spouse, child, or parent who is a
funds under the Drug Control and System Improvement Grant Program. Immigration Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 507(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3753(a)(11) (2003)). In 1996, Congress prohibited the states from barring any
state official or agency from sending information to the INS regarding the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual, something certain cities, such as New York and San
Francisco, had done to thwart deportation of aliens within their jurisdictions. See IIRIRA,
supra note 58, § 642, at 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1999)); Ignatius Bau, Cities of
Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government Cooperation with the INS,
7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 51-52 (1994). It also created a criminal alien identification system to
assist authorities in identifying aliens who may be eligible for deportation because of con-
viction for an aggravated felony, and budgeted $5 million annually for the system. IIRIRA,
supra note 58, §§ 326-27, at 3009-630. Even before the 9/11 attacks, Congress significantly
boosted the INS's enforcement capacity, so that a large portion of criminal aliens would be
apprehended. See Schuck & Williams, supra note 27, at 374 ("[The] INS budget has in-
creased more than five-fold since 1985 and has more than doubled since 1994. As a result,
the INS is now the largest law enforcement agency in the country."). And since its incep-
tion, ICE has made its public mission to remove all criminal aliens from the country. See
Office of Detention & Removal, supra note 113.
121 See Schuck & Williams, supra note 27, at 389-92.
122 See David Shepardson, New Laws See More in State Deported; Immigrant-Felons forced out
of U.S. Under Tough Laws, DFTROIT NEwsJune 12, 2000, at IA ("'We have almost no discre-
tion in most cases,"' (quoting the general counsel for the INS in Detroit)); see also Kan-
stroom, supra note 9, at 1891 ("Deportation is now often a virtually automatic consequence
of criminal conviction."); Schuck & Williams, supra note 27, at 396-97 (noting that the
only group of aliens "retaining any real possibility of avoiding removal after a criminal
conviction ... is small indeed"); Chris Hedges, Condemned Again for Old Crimes; Depowtation
Law Descends Sternly, and Often by Surprise, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at B1 ("'[T]he I.N.S.
commissioner cannot order law enforcement officers not to enforce the law."' (quoting
Representative Barney Frank)).
In the past, criminal aliens had many more options for seeking relief from deporta-
tion. Prior to 1990, for example, state judges could block the INS from deporting an alien
because of a state conviction:
The provisions .. .respecting the deportation of an alien convicted of a
crime or crimes shall not apply .. .if the court sentencing such alien for
such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing
sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attor-
ney General that such alien not be deported ....
8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b)(2) (1990). However, the Judicial Recommendation Against Deporta-
tion procedure was eliminated by section 505 of the Immigration Act of 1990. Pub. L. No.
101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990).
123 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A) (v) (1999).
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citizen or legal permanent resident (and not just the alien).124 Fur-
ther, even when an alien is able to satisfy these demanding require-
ments, two additional hurdles remain. Relief from deportation is
discretionary and a conviction "will always weigh heavily, although not
conclusively against the granting of relief."1 25 In addition, federal law
caps the number of aliens who may be spared deportation in any
given year at 4,000.126 Once all appeals have been exhausted and the
alien is physically removed from the country, she must wait between
five and twenty years to apply for reentry, and this assumes that she
was not convicted of an aggravated felony, for which she would be
permanently barred from returning to the United States.
127
By limiting the avenues for postconviction relief, the INA focuses
an alien's attention almost exclusively on the pending state criminal
case. 128 The state provides an alien who is suspected of committing a
deportable offense her best, and perhaps only, hope of avoiding de-
portation. Aliens will thus contest state charges more vigorously. We
know that many aliens have sought to withdraw guilty pleas made in
ignorance of deportation and instead stand trial.12 9 Simply put, but
124 Id. § 1229b(b). Aliens convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, a drug offense, or
certain other offenses are not eligible for this exception. Id. § 1229b(b) (1) (C). The law
makes another narrow exception for aliens whose life or liberty would be jeopardized by
deportation. See id. § 1231 (b) (3) (A) ("[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to
a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion."). See also KESSELBRENNFR & ROSENBERG,
supra note 100, § 9.14 (discussing asylum and withholding of removal). Some aliens can
also avoid deportation by voluntarily departing the country, though IIRIRA dramatically
limited the availability of this form of relief. Id. § 9.13.
125 Pilcher, supra note 33, at 292.
126 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e).
127 Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A).
128 See Pilcher, supra note 33, at 300 ("As the result of increased determinacy in the
immigration law, actors in the criminal justice system-prosecutors, defense counsel, and
judges-have tremendous power to control (or substantially affect) the outcome of a fu-
ture immigration proceeding when the criminal defendant is an alien."). An alien is not
likely to seek any postconviction relief from the state unless it challenges the validity of the
conviction. The reason is that a conviction expunged or vacated by a state for "rehabilita-
tive reasons" usually remains a conviction for purposes of federal immigration law, regard-
less of how the state might treat it. See Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128-29
(10th Cir. 2005) (surveying cases). In other words, relief that is grantedjust to suspend the
collateral consequences of a conviction will not stave off deportation (even though it might
restore other civil rights).
129 E.g., Rollins v. Georgia, 591 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 2004) (alien may withdraw ten-year-old
guilty plea to cocaine offense because she was never informed of the deportation conse-
quences); Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (alien may withdraw plea to
drug offenses because trial counsel should have told him he would be deported); Machado
v. State, 839 A.2d 509 (R.I. 2003) (alien may withdraw plea to felony breaking and entering
charge because trial court failed to adequately advise him of the deportation consequences
of the plea); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (alien may withdraw
plea to sexual battery because counsel had misrepresented the deportation consequences
of the plea); State v. Douangmala, 646 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2002) (alien may withdraw plea
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for the threat of deportation, these aliens would have been satisfied
pleading guilty. In one case, for example, an immigrant who pled no-
contest to a deportable state crime was confronted by INS officials
only minutes after he made his plea. He immediately rushed back to
the court to change his plea and force the state to go to trial.1 30 He
could have fought the state charge earlier, but it is telling that he
chose not to until faced with the additional federal sanction. In an-
other case, an alien put up his house just so that he could afford to
withdraw his guilty plea and take his case to trial, all to avoid deporta-
tion.131 Criminal defense manuals also instruct defense attorneys to
take a case to trial rather than accept a plea to a deportable offense.
13 2
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the effect deportation
may have on the decision to go to trial, noting that avoiding the collat-
eral consequence of deportation is likely to be "one of the principal
benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer
or instead to proceed to trial." 13 3 States also recognize that deporta-
tion is often the most important consideration for an alien charged
with a state crime. At least seventeen states and the District of Colum-
bia require their courts to advise criminal defendants that a guilty plea
may trigger deportation before allowing the defendant to accept such
a plea.' 3 4 In eight of these states, failure to give this warning is auto-
because trial court failed to adequately advise him regarding the deportation conse-
quences of the plea); Doug Grow, Anoka Court Ruling Answers Prayers; Judge Allows Man to
Withdraw Guilty Plea to Avoid Deportation, STAR TsaB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 18, 1998, at B2
(alien may withdraw plea and stand trial because of harsh deportation sanction); Alan
Kohn, Alien Allowed to Withdraw Criminal Plea, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1993, at 1 (alien may with-
draw plea and stand trial on manslaughter charge to stave off deportation); Michael
Sangiacomo, Immigrant Contesting Deportation: Spouse Abuse Plea Could Return Him to Yemen,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Oct. 17, 1999 (wife of immigrant who pleaded no contest
to beating her claimed: "If either of us realized that by pleading no contest that the life
that we have known would end, he would not have [pleaded guilty]."). For a discussion of
the grounds on which an alien may seek to set aside the plea, see infra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text. Regardless of whether these claims are successful, the fact that they
are being made suggests that aliens who know that pleading guilty will get them deported
sometimes opt for trial instead.
130 See Wayne L. Brown, Former Presque Isle Doctor Nixes No-Contest Pleas, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, June 30, 1999, at B4.
131 See Shepardson, supra note 122.
132 See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Defending Non-Citizens in Minnesota Courts: A Practical
Guide to Immigration Law and Client Cases, 17 LAW & INEQ. 567, 623 (1999); see also Patrick A.
Tuite, Supervision Sometimes Is Too Good to be True Relief CIH. DAILy L. BuLL., May 17, 2000, at
5 (warning defense attorneys to "be very cautious before entering any plea of guilty where
the client is an alien, for the ramifications may be very drastic and may ruin that person's
life").
133 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001); see also Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603,
612 (9th Cir. 1999) ("That an alien charged with a crime ... would factor the immigration
consequences of conviction in deciding whether to plead or proceed to trial is well-
documented.").
134 These states include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
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matic grounds for vacating the conviction, thereby permitting the
alien to enter a new plea. 135 It is noteworthy that in some of these
states there is no similar rule requiring the courts or the defense bar
to inform defendants of the other collateral consequences stemming
from a guilty plea, an indication of just how uniquely important the
deportation sanction is.
How large is the cost to the states when aliens chose to go to trial
rather than accept a plea? Since 1992, the federal government has
removed more than 500,000 criminal aliens from this country. -6 Not
every one of these case5 went to trial because of the threat of deporta-
tion (for the reasons discussed above in Part I.D), but the figures-
including nearly 68,000 deportations in 2003 alone that easily could
have stemmed from state cases-reveal tremendous potential ramifi-
cations. If even a small percentage of these cases go to trial, the states'
additional cost will be substantial.
Rather than ending in trial, many criminal cases involving aliens
may take a different route. The defendant and the prosecutor may
attempt to bargain around the sanction. But because so many crimes
Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(a) (West 1985),
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j(a) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-713(a) (2001); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 802E-2 (1993); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/113-8 (2004 Supp.); MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-242; MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 29D (1992); MINN. R. CIuM. P. 15.01(10) (d); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
12-210(f) (2003); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1819.02(1) (2004 Supp.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 220.50(7) (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1022(a)(7) (2001); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2943.031(A) (Anderson 2003); OR. REv. STAT. § 135.385(2) (d) (2003); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 12-12-22(b) (2002); TEX. CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a) (4) (Vernon 1989); WASH.
REv. CODE § 10.40.200(2) (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.08(1)(c) (West 1999). Califor-
nia's warning is representative:
If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the of-
fense for which you have been charged may have the consequences of de-
portation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(a).
135 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-]j(c); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
713(b); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 29D; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2943.031(D); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 12-12-22(c); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.40.200(2); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.08(2). Six of
these states go so far as to presume that the court, absent a record to the contrary, never
gave the warning. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-713(b); MAss. GEN.
LAWs ch. 278, § 29D; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (E); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-12-22(c);
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.40.200(2). In addition to warning aliens about deportation, at least
seven states actively encourage them to rethink plea deals that trigger deportation, by, e.g.,
advising them to take time to rethink such agreements. CAL. PENAl COnE § 1016.5(d);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j(a); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-713(b); HAw. REv. STAT. § 823E-1; NEB.
R~v. STAT. § 29-1819.03; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (A); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-12-
22(b). Finally, at least nine states attempt to protect aliens from deportation, at least in the
short term, by not requiring them to divulge their legal status during the state court pro-
ceedings. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5(d); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1j(b); FlAw. REv. STAT.
§ 823E-1; MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-242 advisory committee's note; MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 29D;
NEB. REv. S-ATr. § 29-1819.03; OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2943.031 (C); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-12-
22(d); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.40.200(1).
136 See sources cited supra note 95.
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and so many dispositions trigger deportation, circumventing the sanc-
tions is no easy task. The INA defines "conviction" broadly to cover
many dispositions that the states themselves do not consider convic-
tions for purposes of state law. In addition to formal judgments of
guilt entered by a court, the federal definition of conviction encom-
passes cases in which the judgment of guilt has been withheld, so long
as the alien "has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt,
and ... the judge has ordered some form of punishment," even if it
has been suspended. 137 Congress intended to close what it consid-
ered loopholes created by state law that permitted "aliens who have
clearly been guilty of criminal behavior and whom Congress intended
to be considered 'convicted"' to escape deportation. 1 38 For example,
a state might dismiss a domestic abuse charge against an alien once he
completes a required counseling program. The state might not con-
sider this to be a conviction, but the alien would still be convicted in
the eyes of ICE if he admitted his guilt at any time during the state
proceedings. 139 Federalizing the definition of conviction thereby pre-
vents states from bargaining around deportation merely by manipulat-
ing the state's characterization of the disposition.
Many alien defendants nonetheless try to avoid deportation by
negotiating a plea for a noncovered offense, which is usually, though
not always, a less serious offense as well.' 40 Indeed, prosecutors have
acknowledged manipulating state charges to circumvent federal de-
portation. For example, in one case, a Michigan prosecutor admitted
charging a young immigrant boy with a lesser offense in order to stave
off deportation and keep his family in the United States. The change
in charge was quite dramatic: the initial charged offense was first de-
gree criminal sexual conduct (the boy had raped and impregnated his
twelve-year-old sister), punishable by life in prison, whereas the ulti-
mate offense of conviction was fourth degree criminal sexual conduct,
137 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)( 4 8 ) (1999). The 1996 amendments to the INA federalized the
meaning of conviction in the immigration context. See IIRIRA, supra note 58; H.R. REP.
No. 104-879, at 123 (1997) (noting that the purpose of § 101 (a) (48) (A) of IIRIRA is to
"broaden the definition of 'conviction' for immigration law purposes . . . [to] make it
easier to remove criminal aliens, regardless of specific procedures in States for deferred
adjudication or suspension of sentences").
This definition of conviction differs from the one used for purposes of the federal
firearms ban. The Gun Control Act relies more heavily upon how a state treats a particular
determination in deciding whether that determination constitutes a "conviction" for pur-
poses of federal law. See discussion infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
138 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 224 (1996).
139 See Pilcher, supra note 33, at 321-22 (describing state diversion programs as convic-
tions under the INA regardless of state treatment),
140 See id. at 300 ("Charging decisions and plea discussions... offer the greatest oppor-
tunities for practitioners to account for immigration impacts in their decisionmaking
processes.").
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a misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of two years. 141 Com-
menting on the case, the prosecutor criticized the INS, saying it left
him in an untenable position: "'They are basically telling me that I
either should not charge a 17-year-old alleged rapist, or I should have
the victim of the crime deported to India along with her brother and
parents.... Neither solution is acceptable."' 1 42 Similar stories of plea
deals to avoid hardship abound. 14 Likewise, criminal defense manu-
als openly suggest plea manipulation strategies to avoid deportation
by negotiating for a noncovered offense.' 44
Because of the breadth of crimes and dispositions triggering de-
portation, it is difficult for the state prosecutor to thwart deportation
without compromising state objectives. Yet in the shadow of the de-
portation sanction, state prosecutors are willing to offer pleas to lesser
charges for two main reasons. First, flexibility in plea negotiations
helps avoid the costs of going to trial. Indeed, given a fixed budget,
the prosecutor may not even be able to afford handling additional
trials.
Second, the prosecutor may sympathize with the alien defendants
because of the extreme hardship attending deportation. Past experi-
ence suggests that state prosecutors will face a large number of com-
pelling hardship cases. Prior to 1996, the Attorney General had
discretionary authority to grant relief from deportation under section
212 (c) of the INA, but IIRIRA significantly narrowed that authority. 145
The St. Cyr Court noted that, before IIRIRA, "the class of aliens whose
continued residence in this country has depended on their eligibility
141 Schabath, supra note 37. While the effort may have ultimately proven futile-even
the lesser charge may have subjected the boy to deportation-it shows the lengths to which
prosecutors will go to help certain aliens escape deportation.
142 Id.
143 E.g., Sue Carlton, Immigration Nightmare Has a Happy End, This Time, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at BI (describing how an Austrian immigrant, facing deportation
after being convicted for stealing from a family while babysitting in 1979 and then for
shoplifting in 1983, was able to circumvent the deportation with the assistance of the judge
and prosecutor by dropping one of the old convictions and reducing the other); Richard
Liebson & Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, 1996 Immigration Act Keeps Woman in Pison, JOURNAL NEws
(Westchester, N.Y.), Jan. 22, 2001, at IA (reporting that a Queens prosecutor agreed to
accept a plea to disorderly conduct-rather than prostitution and loitering-because do-
ing so would permit an alien to avoid deportation).
144 E.g., Baldini-Potermin, supra note 132. See also Tuite, supra note 132, noting that:
If you have a case in which the charges are such that a plea of guilty to
those charges will mean automatic or probable deportation you should sit
down with the prosecutor and/or the judge (in the state system) to explain
the ramifications of a finding of guilty or pleading guilty to the charges.
Maybe, if you have the right client or climate, the prosecutors would agree
to a plea or a finding to something that would not cause deportation.
145 See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), repealed by
IIRIRA, supra note 58, § 240B(b), at 3009-597; see also IIRIRA §240A(b) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (1999)) (barring relief for aggravated felonies, drug-based convictions,
certain weapons offenses, and multiple convictions of crimes of moral turpitude).
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for § 212(c) relief is extremely large," and that from 1989 to 1995,
over 10,000 aliens-more than one-half of those who sought relief-
were granted relief under that provision. 146 In other words, in nearly
one-half of cases prior to 1996, federal immigration officials had de-
termined that deportation was not warranted, based on a variety of
factors including the seriousness of the offense, evidence of rehabilita-
tion, duration of the alien's residence, impact of deportation on the
alien's family, and service in the U.S. Armed Forces. 147 The federal
government now considers none of these factors.1 48 If they are to play
any role in determining whether an alien is deported, it must be in
state plea negotiations.
The deportation provisions of the INA may deter some crimes
committed by aliens, assuming aliens are aware of the deportation
consequences ex ante. At the very least, deportation saves the states
the cost of prosecuting and imprisoning some aliens who would have
committed additional crimes had they remained in the country. De-
porting aliens on the basis of state convictions, however, may be more
costly than Congress realizes. Attaching virtually automatic deporta-
tion consequences to certain state convictions dramatically increases
the stakes involved in the underlying state proceedings. Not surpris-
ingly, alien defendants often resist these state charges more fiercely,
forcing more trials and appeals. (If even a small portion of these
aliens resist state charges more fiercely because of the threat of depor-
tation, the burden on the states will be quite large.) The states must
either bear these implementation costs or else circumvent deporta-
tion, which often requires reducing the sanction the states impose.
Thus, while the net effects of the federal law are impossible to assess
with precision, it is likely that the federal sanction is imposed less
often (or less consistently) than Congress might expect, and it is possi-
ble the deportation sanction may actually reduce the total sanction
levied on certain alien defendants.
B. The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act
The 1996 Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act pro-
hibits any individual who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence from purchasing, transporting, or possessing fire-
arms. 149 A misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is any offense
146 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295-96 & n.5, 326 (2001) (also holding that the repeal
of § 212(c) relief did not apply retroactively to an alien who had pleaded guilty before the
Act was passed).
147 See id. at 296 n.5.
148 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
149 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g) (9) (2000)). The firearm must
have been transported in interstate commerce. Id.
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under federal or (more likely) state law that has as an element "the
use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon" against a spouse or child, or a person similarly situ-
ated. 50 Violations of the ban are punishable by up to ten years im-
prisonment and a fine.15 1
The firearms ban is designed to prevent the escalation of violence
in domestic situations by taking firearms out of the hands of abusers.
As Senator Frank Lautenberg, the sponsor of the measure, noted,
"[A]ll too often, the difference between a battered woman and a dead
woman is the presence of a gun. 1 5 2 Congress was frustrated by the
way states were handling domestic violence cases, finding that states
treated domestic abusers too leniently. 53 Since most domestic abus-
ers were being charged with misdemeanors, they escaped the reach of
existing gun control regulations, which then applied only to convicted
felons. 154
The significance of the firearms ban varies from case to case, de-
pending on the value the convicted abuser attaches to the privilege of
purchasing, possessing, and transporting firearms. The ban is a par-
ticularly severe sanction for anyone who must handle a firearm on the
job, such as police officers, prison guards, active duty soldiers, reserv-
ists, and gun dealers. These people will lose their jobs if the ban is
triggered. 155 For them, the federal firearms ban will overshadow all
A related provision bars anyone subject to a court restraining order from possessing a
firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (8).
150 Id. § 921(a) (33) (A).
151 Id. § 924(a)(2).
152 142 CONG. Rc. S11,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(noting study showing the risk of murder increases threefold when a gun is present).
153 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S1l,876 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg) (noting that most domestic violence offenders plead down to a misdemeanor
and get away with only a "slap on the wrist"); 142 CONG. REc. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12,
1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("The fact is that in many places domestic violence
is not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal behavior.").
154 142 CONG. REc. H10,434 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)
(Our biggest problem is many States have not lifted domestic violence convictions to the
level of a felony. They consider them a misdemeanor. Other States have allowed people,
even though it is considered a felony, to plead guilty to a lesser crime. Therefore, . . . an
awful lot of people who have been convicted of domestic violence problems are able to
escape [the Gun Control Act].); 142 CONG. REC. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Lautenberg) ("This amendment would close this dangerous loophole and
keep guns away from violent individuals who threaten their own families. .. ."). Previously,
domestic abuse only triggered the federal firearms ban if it was prosecuted as a felony,
defined as "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18
U.S.C. § 9 2 2(g)(1).
155 Unlike other sections of the Gun Control Act, the Lautenberg Amendment does
not exempt public employees from its coverage. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1) (exempting
from the prohibition all firearms issued for the use of any government agent, except for
those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence); Amend Section 658 of the
Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus Appropriations Act: Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemanor
Crime of Domestic Violence: Hearing on H.R. 26 and HR. 445 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
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other considerations, particularly the "slap on the wrist" they can ex-
pect from the state.1 56
A state conviction automatically triggers the firearms ban. Upon
conviction, the owner of a firearm must immediately relinquish pos-
session, though no one is designated to inform him of the require-
ment. The federally mandated background check for firearms sales
should also prevent convicted abusers from obtaining new weapons.
The background questionnaire asks a prospective buyer whether he
has ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence, and if the buyer acknowledges such a conviction, the sale will
be blocked. 157 Once the conviction occurs, there is no federal proce-
dure by which the offender can have the ban lifted. While the Gun
Control Act authorizes the Attorney General to issue waivers to per-
sons meeting certain criteria, 58 Congress has forbidden the exercise
of this authority. 159
What have been the effects of the ban? Deterrence is one possi-
bility. The threat of losing a job or a lifelong hobby may deter some
gun users from committing acts of violence covered by the statute.
However, many domestic abusers are unaware of the ban, that is, until
after they have already committed acts of domestic violence.16 0 Chief
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 40 (1997) [hereinafter Gun Ban Hearing] (testi-
mony of Bernard H. Teodorski, National Vice President, Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of
Police) ("For the first time in the history of gun control, the Lautenberg Amendment to
the Gun Control Act of 1968 applies to law enforcement officers and other 'government
entities.' ").
156 Of course, one would not expect the federal ban to affect criminal cases in states
that have a similar state firearms ban. However, few states have adopted bans that are as
stringent as the Lautenberg ban. See Melanie L. Mecka, Note, Seizing the Ammunition From
Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 Ruzrcsps L.j. 607, 628
n.116, 629 (1998) (reporting over twenty-five state statutes that in some way restrict the
gun ownership of domestic abusers, but noting that only four of these states have bans that
are nearly as strict as the federal ban). California law, for example, prohibits individuals
who have been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses from possessing fire-
arms for ten years beyond the date of conviction, but permits sentencing courts to lift the
ban for law enforcement officers. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(c)(1)-(2) (West 1999).
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (3) (B)(1).
158 Id. § 925(c) (providing that an individual who is prohibited from possessing fire-
arms may apply for relief to the Attorney General, who may grant such relief if "the circum-
stances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that
the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest").
159 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub.
L. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992); see also United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74-76
(2002) (holding that courts have no independent authority to grant a waiver).
160 See cases cited infra note 165, in which defendants petition to withdraw guilty pleas
to crimes of domestic violence because they were unaware of the ban at the time they made
the pleas. Senator Lautenberg, in fact, admitted that few offenders would be aware of the
ban until they were denied a firearms purchase. 142 CONG. REc. S11,363 (daily ed. Sept.
26, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("As a practical matter, most abusers are unlikely
to get... advance notice [of the ban]."); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348
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Judge Richard Posner suggests that the firearms ban is "malum prohib-
itum, not malum in se; that is, it is not the kind of law that a lay person
would intuit existed because the conduct it forbade was contrary to
the moral code of his society."' 61 Simply put, the ban cannot deter
the unwary.1 6
2
The ban may have had more success at incapacitating domestic
abusers (i.e., taking away their firearms) than at deterring them. Li-
censes for thousands of firearms purchases have been denied because
of the ban.a63 Keeping guns away from domestic abusers is an unques-
tionably good idea. Unfortunately, this is not easily done. The reason
is that abusers contest domestic violence charges more vigorously be-
cause of the ban and often find ways to evade it.
The Lautenberg ban gives a suspected abuser a compelling rea-
son to refuse any plea to a crime of domestic violence and take his
case to trial. As one defense attorney explained, "A week in jail is
worth the risk [of trial] to a guy who considers hunting an important
part of his life .... You have to remember, this ban is forever."' 64
Many convicted domestic abusers have sought to withdraw their guilty
pleas, claiming they would have opted for trial had they known about
the firearms ban.' 65 We can infer from these cases that the
n.15 (1971) (noting that in states without their own firearms ban defendants are unlikely
to be on notice that they cannot possess firearms).
161 United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 295 ("The purpose of criminal laws is to bnng about compliance with
desired norms of behavior. In the present case it is to reduce domestic violence by getting
guns out of the hands of people who are behaving menacingly toward.., an estranged or
former spouse. This purpose is ill served by keeping the law a secret .... In such circum-
stances the law is not a deterrent. It is a trap." (citation omitted)).
Ex ante ignorancc of the ban limits the ban's deterrent effect but not its potential to
disrupt the prosecution of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. Just because an
abuser was ignorant of the ban when he committed his offense does not mean that he will
remain in the dark once he is facing criminal charges. An abuser may discover the ban-
his attorney may inform him of it, for example-in time to change his approach to the
state's criminal case against him. And even an offender who remains ignorant of the ban
until after he is convicted might later attempt to withdraw his guilty plea or petition for an
expungement when he finally discovers it-when he attempts to purchase a firearm, for
example.
163 Violence Against Women Act of 1999, Stalking Prevention and Victim Protection Act of
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1248 and H.RK 1869 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 25 (1999) (testimony of Bonnie Campbell, Director, Violence
Against Women Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice) (noting that 7,700 handgun sales blocked
through background checks in 1997 were denied because of a domestic violence convic-
tion or restraining order).
164 Jason Wolfe, Gun Ban to Deter Abusers Draws Fire, PORTLAND PREss HERALD (Maine),
Feb. 7, 1997, at IA.
165 E.g., Commonwealth v. Indelicato, 667 N.E.2d 300, 301 (Mass. App. Ct., 1996);
State v. Tollefson, No. CI-98-1712, 1999 WL 366577, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8, 1999);
State v. Kosina, 595 N.W.2d 464, 465 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Molzner, Nos. 99-0311-
CR, 99-0312-CR, 1999 WL 497161, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 1999); see also Officer Could
Lose Job Because of New Federal Gun Law, A.P. POL. SERVICE, Dec. 20, 1996.
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Lautenberg ban has made standing trial more attractive in compari-
son to pleading guilty. Further, defense attorneys have noted a rise in
tiial rates for domestic violence cases since the Lautenberg Amend-
ment was enacted.' 6 6
Of course, many defendants would prefer to circumvent the
Lautenberg firearms ban through charge bargaining. Trial may be
more attractive than a plea triggering the ban, but it is still a last re-
sort. Compared to deportation, Lautenberg is easy to circumvent.
Some defendants avoid the Lautenberg ban by pleading to a noncov-
ered offense. For example, a defendant could plead to a crime that
does not have as an element the use or attempted use of force, such as
disorderly conduct as opposed to assault and battery.' 67 But non-
violent offenses like disorderly conduct typically carry less severe state
sentences and social stigma than violent offenses like assault and
battery.
Another way to skirt the Lautenberg ban is to negotiate for a dis-
position the federal law does not consider to be a conviction. For
example, a defendant could enter a no-contest plea to a violent misde-
meanor, accompanied by a light sentence. 16 8 If the state does not
consider such an arrangement to be a conviction for state law pur-
poses, it is not a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms ban
either. 169 (Contrast this with the definition of conviction for purposes
166 See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 164 ("Defense lawyers in Portland courts say many de-
fendants who in the past were willing to negotiate a plea now are opting to risk a jury trial
after they are advised about the [Lautenberg] gun ban.").
167 See Laura A. Przybylinski Finn, Those Convicted of Domestic Violence Cannot Possess Fire-
arms, 72 Wis. LAw. 57, 58 (1999) (noting that many disorderly conduct convictions will not
meet the requirements of § 921 (a) (33) because the government is not required to prove
that the defendant used force). For a list of charges that police typically file against domes-
tic abusers, see People v. Singleton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988).
168 Jonathan D. Rockoff, Domestic-Assault Plea Lets Officer Keep Gun, Job, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., May 29, 1998, at Al (noting that an officer who entered a no-contest plea to charge
of domestic assault and was sentenced to court costs and counseling was not "convicted"
under Rhode Island law). Similarly, many states have diversion laws, which allow defend-
ants to avoid conviction. See, e.g, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38c(g) (2004) (allowing for the
dismissal of charges if a batterer successfully completes a counseling program).
169 In the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Congress rejected the Court's decision in
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983), which held that federal law
determines what constitutes a conviction, and reaffirmed its desire not "'to place any un-
due or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to
the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms.'" Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1 (b) (2), 100 Stat.
449, 450 (1986) (quoting the Gun Control Act of 1968). Accordingly, for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 921:
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accor-
dance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.
Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a per-
son has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be consid-
ered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon,
expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the per-
son may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
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of deportation discussed above.) State prosecutors have acknowl-
edged that they reduce state charges to help some defendants avoid
Lautenberg consequences. For example, one Florida State Attorney
acknowledged giving corrections officers accused of domestic violence
preferential treatment because of the firearms ban; the State Attorney
defers prosecution and promises to drop the charges later if the of-
ficer attends anger management classes or fulfills some other condi-
tion.170 Avoiding a conviction not only undermines the congressional
aims behind the firearms ban, it may dilute the state sanctions as well.
When defendants are put through pretrial diversion programs, for ex-
ample, they may not be punished at all for their actions-by either the
state or Congress. One commentary explains the ramifications:
[D]iversion may not have a strong deterrent effect because it per-
mits the batterer to avoid criminal punishment, and pre-trial diver-
sion allows him to escape prosecution and trial as well. As such,
diversion may communicate a message that domestic violence is not
as serious as assault between strangers, especially if the jurisdiction
does not employ diversion for other offenses. 17 1
It is obvious why defendants would demand new plea arrange-
ments post-Lautenberg: The law has raised the costs of their previous
bargain. But why would prosecutors ever cooperate? Despite the ob-
vious harm done to state law, state prosecutors are likely to treat do-
mestic violence cases even more leniently in the wake of Lautenberg
for three reasons. First, reducing or dropping charges saves the prose-
cutor from having to take many of these cases to trial. The number of
cases likely to be affected by the firearms ban is staggering: Police al-
ready spend more time on domestic violence cases than all other ma-
jor violent felonies combined, and such cases require tremendous
prosecutorial and judicial resources as well.172 Estimates of the an-
nual number of domestic violence incidents range from two to four
million. 173 Many of these cases will involve offenders who will seek to
evade the firearms ban, such as police officers and soldiers, not to
Id. § 101; see also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence: Questions and Answers, at http://ww.atf.treas.
gov/firearms/domestic/qa.hLrn (Apr. 28, 1997).
170 See Becker et al., supra note 44. Judges, too, have helped some abusers skirt the
federal firearms ban. See, e.g., Matt Lait, L.A. Police Panel Reviews Its Watchdog's Action Dis-
pute, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7,1997, at B1 (noting that ajudge allowed a L.A. police officer to
modify his domestic violence plea to a lesser disturbing the peace plea in order to save his
job).
171 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1543.
172 See id. at 1501-02.
173 See 142 CONG. REc. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12,- 1996) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg); Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1501.
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mention avid hunters.1 74 Since many prosecutors do not consider do-
mestic violence a high priority, they are unlikely to divert scarce re-
sources away from other cases; they will reduce or dismiss charges
instead.1 75
A second reason that prosecutors treat defendants more leniently
in the shadow of the Lautenberg ban is that many of them do not
consider domestic violence to be a serious crime.17 6 This bias is
rooted in beliefs that domestic violence is a family matter, that victims
provoke the abuse, and that victims can easily leave abusive relation-
ships.' 77 The Lautenberg ban did nothing to change these underly-
ing attitudes. Instead it gave prosecutors (and other state officials)
cause to treat domestic violence cases even more leniently.1 7 After
lamenting the lack of punishment meted out to police officers ac-
cused of domestic violence before the ban, one commentator
surmised that Lautenberg only "upped the ante-giving officers and
departments another reason to keep the dirty secret."17 9
The third reason a prosecutor may compromise is because the
firearms ban has weakened her case. Victims of domestic violence
may be less willing to pursue charges when their abusers have more to
174 When Congress passed the Amendment, some estimates indicated that up to
60,000 police officers could lose their jobs because of the firearms ban, apparently assum-
ing no circumvention. See Gun Ban Hearing, supra note 155, at 76 (testimony of Donna F.
Edwards, Executive Director, National Network to End Domestic Violence).
175 See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1540 ("Faced with limited
time, personnel, and resources .. .prosecutors often give domestic violence cases low
priority and sometimes even try to persuade battered women not to prosecute.").
176 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 10, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) ("[D]eeply ingrained attitudes often cause police, prosecutors,
judges, and other court personnel to treat domestic violence less severely than other sorts
of violence.").
177 See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1502-03.
178 See, e.g., Chris Graves, Officer Gets Gun Back; Returns to Work After Court Ruling, STAR
TIjB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 7, 1997, at 1B (noting that a prosecutor did not object to al-
lowing a police officer to withdraw his guilty plea to domestic violence, because the state
and the officer's family would suffer if the ban were applied to him).
In states with domestic violence firearms laws, state officials are often* unwilling to
enforce them. For example, in Utah,judges have declined to order domestic abusers to
surrender their firearms pursuant to a 1995 state law. SeeJim Stingl, Abuse Suspects Keeping
Guns: Law in Domestic Violence Cases Mostly Ignored, MILWAUKaEEJ. SENTINEL, Oct. 11, 1996, at
1. Some state judges in Wisconsin have returned firearms to men covered by a state do-
mestic violence firearms ban so the men could go hunting. Id.
1 71 Ragsdale, supra note 90. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, which
opposes lifting the ban as applied to government officials, argued before Congress that:
[Plolice officers and other law enforcement personnel already have too
many advantages. Women seeking to prosecute law enforcement personnel
face many barriers in a criminal justice system where police officers have
important connections to prosecutors, court personnel, and their friends
on the force who will be the first to respond to domestic violence reports.
Gun Ban Hearing, supra note 155 (written testimony of the National Coalition Against Do-
mestic Violence).
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lose.' 80 Without the support of the victim's testimony, the prosecutor
may have little hope of convincing a jury to convict. 8 Thus, even if
the prosecutor is willing and able to go to trial, settling the case and
inflicting some sanction on the defendant, no matter how small, may
better serve state goals.
Even if these pretrial tactics fail and the state ultimately convicts
the defendant at trial, the defendant has one more opportunity to
avoid the Lautenberg sanction. A defendant who has been convicted
by the state can have the firearms ban lifted by having the conviction
expunged under state law.182 Expungement removes the conviction
from the person's criminal record and thereby restores whatever
rights had been forfeit because of it.' s
The Lautenberg ban has made it even more likely that domestic
abusers will have their convictions expunged. First, the Lautenberg
Amendment makes it more worthwhile to seek an expungement. Sec-
ond, it may increase the odds of receiving one, since courts may sym-
pathize more with persons convicted of domestic violence offenses
that subject them to the federal sanction. In one case, a California
judge granted a police officer an expungement so he could keep his
firearm and his job, despite the fact he had brutally and repeatedly
raped his estranged wife. 18 4 "[I] nstead of taking away the guns," one
commentator suggests, "the courts have taken away the
convictions."'18
5
Notably, thousands of convicted domestic abusers have had their
records expunged since 1996, including many who would not have
qualified for or sought an expungement prior to the passage of the
Lautenberg Amendment.1 86 In Rhode Island, for example, state
180 See, e.g., Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1526 (noting that prose-
cution for domestic violence offenses may impose financial hardship on victims and thus
make them less willing to press charges); Becker et al., supra note 44 ("'We began having
problems getting wives or girlfriends to go forward with prosecutions [after the
Lautenberg Amendment was passed].... Many of them live on state property, so if the
wife testifies against a husband, not only are they losing an income, they are losing their
home.'" (quoting Florida State Attorney Rod Smith)).
181 See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 44, at 1540.
182 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (33) (B) (ii) (2000) ("A person shall not be considered to have
been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been
expunged ... unless the... expungement... expressly provides that the person may not
..possess .. .firearms.").
183 Grant et al., supra note 2, 1149-50 (reviewing the legal effect of states' expunge-
ment statutes).
184 See Hector Tobar, Officer's Expunged Conviction Angers Ex-Wfe, LA. TIMES, May 26,
1997, at B1; see also Graves, supra note 178 (noting that four out of the five Minneapolis
police officers affected by the law in 1996 had their records cleared within one month).
185 California Abusers Find Way to Skirt Gun Law, CRARLsToN DAILY MAIL, May 27,1997,
at Al.
186 See, e.g., Maria C. Hunt, New Gun Law For Batterers Comes Armed With Loophole, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 20, 1997, at Al (noting that hundreds of police officers in San
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courts expunged over 1,300 domestic assault convictions and nolo
pleas obtained in the five years following passage of the Lautenberg
Amendment (1997-2001), compared to fewer than 350 in the previ-
ous five years (1992-1996).187 Other states have experienced similar
trends.1 88
Like reducing charges or dismissing cases altogether, expunging
a criminal record lowers the total sanction imposed on domestic abus-
ers. An expungement eliminates most, if not all, of the lingering con-
sequences associated with a criminal conviction. Thus, when a court
grants a defendant an expungement to relieve him of the firearms
ban, it may also relieve him of any other consequences that stem from
the conviction, such as sentencing enhancements that are triggered by
second or third convictions.18 9 In other contexts, state and federal
law enforcement officials have opposed the granting of expungements
on the grounds they
hamper law enforcement [since] ... past history is vital to police in
assessing whether there is 'probable cause' to believe a suspect was
involved in a crime; to prosecutors, in deciding how tough a charge
to bring; and to judges, in deciding whether cash bail should be
required at the outset, and in sentencing later on. 190
Diego were expected to utilize the California expungement statute as a result of the fire-
arms ban); Ragsdale, supra note 90 ("Shortly after the consequences of the Lautenberg Act
became known, there was a scramble by police officers to have their records expunged.").
187 E-mail from Michael Tenney, Sr. Oracle Developer, Rhode Island Supreme Court
Judicial Technology Center, to author (Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with author) (providing raw
data on expungements in Rhode Island by offense type); see also Katherine Gregg, RI.
Courts Expunged Thousands of Records, PROVIDENCE SUNDAYJ., April 25, 1999, Al (noting the
increase in expungements granted by Rhode Island courts and telling the stories of some
who sought to expunge convictions). The totals given include crimes explicitly labeled
crimes of domestic violence (e.g., domestic assault), as well as a few crimes that may or may
not involve a domestic situation or violence (e.g., simple battery, domestic vandalism).
There were more instances of the former than the latter in the dataset. See E-mail from
Michael Tenney, supra,
188 Unfortunately, not all states track expungements the way Rhode Island does.
Three other states that grant expungements were able to provide useful data. See E-mail
from Suzanne R. Briscoe, Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification, to author (Mar. 24,
2004) (on file with author) (reporting that total misdemeanor expungements in Utah rose
from 513 in 1995 to 904 in 2001); E-mail from Paul Perrone, Chief of Research & Statistics,
CPJA Division, Hawaii State Department of the Attorney General, to author (Dec. 17,
2003) (on file with author) (reporting that between 1993 and 1996, Hawaii expunged only
one conviction for abuse of a family member, and that ten such convictions were expunged
between 1997 and 1998 before the law authorizing the expungements was repealed); Fax
from Willene White-Smith, Manager, Georgia Uniform Crime Reporting Program (June
28, 2004) (on file with author) (total expungements in Georgia rose from 292 in 1995 to
700 in 2001).
189 See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Pardoned or Expunged Conviction as
"Prior Offense" Under State Statute or Regulation Enhancing Punishment for Subsequent Conviction,
97 A.L.R.5th 293 (2002).
190 Gregg, supra note 187.
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The net effect of the Lautenberg Amendment, and whether its
benefits outweigh its costs, is far from clear. By taking guns away from
thousands of convicted abusers, the ban may have prevented violence
from escalating in many homes. That would be a commendable ac-
complishment. However, as predicted by the theory in Part I, many
abusers have been able to thwart the ban in state criminal justice sys-
tems. If the only flaw in the Lautenberg Amendment was that it failed
to take guns away from even more of these abusers, we could still ap-
plaud it. Unfortunately, the problems run deeper than this. The ban
has changed the incentives of defendants and prosecutors alike. By
raising the stakes of plea and trial by varying amounts (at least when a
defendant has some chance of acquittal at trial), the ban has made
certain defendants less willing to plead to domestic abuse. To obtain
a domestic violence conviction, states must now take more cases to
trial at great cost. But prosecutors may be unwilling to go to trial and
may instead oblige defendant requests to negotiate around the ban.
It now appears that, because of the changes wrought by Lautenberg,
some state prosecutors are treating domestic abuse cases even more
leniently than before the law was passed. Cases have been dismissed
and charges have been reduced. And even if a defendant is convicted,
courts may still expunge the conviction to relieve the hardships that
follow from this supplemental sanction. Clearly Congress never con-
sidered these costs. Part III will examine ways to reduce them.
C. Laws Denying Federal Benefits
The next three laws share a common theme: They deny federal
benefits-welfare, public housing, and student financial aid-to those
caught breaking state or federal drug laws. These laws were adopted
between 1988 and 1998, and they all appear to be designed in some
measure to deter drug use or eliminate drug-related crime.
The threatened loss of federal benefits might deter drug use, or
the sanction might motivate recipients to contest drug charges more
vigorously. However, these laws differ in two key respects from the
deportation and firearms ban sanctions discussed above, making them
less likely to play a major role in state criminal proceedings. First, the
beneficiaries are by definition needy and may not have access to the
resources necessary to put up a more vigorous defense against the
state. Second, even when they could afford to do so, these defendants
may not find it worthwhile to contest the criminal charges any more
aggressively, because these sanctions-while harsh to some-are not
as severe as the ones considered previously. A brief examination of
these laws helps to show why, as predicted by the theory set forth in
Part I, not all federal sanctions disrupt the enforcement of state law to
the same degree.
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1. Welfare
Congress overhauled the welfare system in 1996, and the corner-
stone of the reforms was the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.191 The Act replaced Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). Under TANF, the federal government gives
states block grants to help finance aid to poor families. 19 2 It also gives
the states flexibility in deciding how to distribute these funds.
One of the more controversial provisions of the Act, section
115 (a), imposes a lifetime ban on federally funded cash assistance and
food stamps for anyone convicted of a state or federal drug-related
felony.'9 3 The measure was intended to deter drug use among welfare
recipients.' 94 Like other supplemental sanctions, the welfare ban
adds to the total sanction levied upon those who are convicted of seri-
ous drug crimes.
However, the welfare ban differs in important respects from the
sanctions discussed earlier. In keeping with the Act's devolution of
authority to the states, the Act gives states permission to modify or
completely opt out of the ban.19 5 In other words, states can tailor the
sanction as they see fit to minimize the burden it imposes on the crim-
inal justice system. As of 2001, eight states had completely opted out
of the system. 196 Thus, drug convictions do not necessarily affect eligi-
bility to receive federal welfare benefits in these states. Twenty other
states have softened the ban in various ways. These states limit the
duration of the ban, apply it only to the most serious offenses, deny
only one form of aid (but not both), permit disqualified individuals to
regain eligibility by completing drug treatment, or recognize exemp-
tions for those who would be hardest hit by the ban (pregnant wo-
men, mothers with infants, and victims of domestic violence, for
191 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
192 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
193 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2000).
194 See H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2187
("The plan also combats substance abuse by allowing States to sanction welfare recipients
who test positive for illicit drug use."); 142 CONG. REC. S8498 (daily ed. July 23, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Gramn) ("[lIf we are serious about our drug laws, we ought not to give
people welfare benefits who are violating the Nation's drug laws."); 142 CONG. REC.
S9337-38 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bond) (citing need to "punish" wel-
fare recipients who use drugs).
195 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d)(1)(A)-(B) ("A State may . . .exempt any or all individuals
domiciled in the State from the application of subsection (a).... A State may... limit the
period for which subsection (a) of this section shall apply to any or all individuals domi-
ciled in the State.").
196 ALLARD, supra note 55, at 2.
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example).' 9 7 The remaining twenty-two states have decided to en-
force the ban in full. 9 8
To be sure, the welfare ban is a "potentially serious sanction" 99
in the states that have chosen to enforce it in whole or in part. More
than 90,000 women are now ineligible to receive welfare because of
the ban.2 00 Those affected by the ban stand to lose on average $84
per month in federally funded food stamps2 1 and another $153 per
month in TANF benefits.20 2 Recipients of such aid are by definition
poor, and the loss of the aid may make it more difficult for some to
raise their children, afford housing, or successfully complete drug
rehabilitation.2 0
3
Nevertheless, the welfare ban appears unlikely to affect state or
federal criminal proceedings in those states that have elected to keep
it. For one thing, the persons affected by the ban probably cannot
afford to wage a protracted fight against the drug charges. Further,
not to trivialize the importance of welfare benefits, but the magnitude
of the loss appears small, at least in comparison to a sanction such as
deportation, for example. 20 4 First, the ban is limited in duration.
While opponents characterize it as a lifetime ban, under the terms of
the 1996 welfare reforms individuals may not receive federal welfare
benefits for more than five years anyway.2 05 Second, the ban does not
197 See id. These states have thus modified the features of the sanction-including its
severity, the breadth of crimes triggering it, and its emphasis on convictions at the expense
of other considerations-that have the greatest potential to distort criminal cases involving
welfare recipients. See supra Part I.D.1.
198 See id. The California statute is typical:
An individual shall be ineligible for aid under this chapter if the individual
has been convicted in state or federal court after December 31, 1997, in-
cluding any plea of guilty or nolo contendere, of a felony that has as an
element the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled substance....
CAL. WELF. & INST. § 11251.3(a) (West 1999).
199 Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2000).
200 ALLARD, supra note 55, at 4 (reporting that as of 2002, 92,000 women in twenty-
three states had permanently lost their eligibility to receive welfare benefits because of a
felony drug conviction). No data is available for the number of men affected by the ban or
the number of women affected by the ban in other states.
201 This figure dates from 2003. Food and Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food
Stamp Program: Average Monthly Benefit per Person (Mar. 24, 2005), at http://www.fns.usda.
gov/pd/fsfybft.htm.
202 TANF figure dates from 2001. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HE-ALLTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM (TANF):
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1149 tbl.2:7:b (2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/ofa/annualreport5/.
203 See ALLARD, supra note 55, at 8 (discussing the repercussions of the ban and ex-
plaining that by forcing former welfare recipients to get a job, the ban reduces their odds
of successfully completing drug treatment).
204 The ban is also not certain to apply when the recipient is convicted because the
recipient could move from a state which has adopted the ban to one which has not.
205 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (7) (2003).
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affect the welfare eligibility of other family members. 20 6 It simply does
not make sense for welfare beneficiaries to invest more of their time
and money for a chance to skirt this particular sanction. Besides, in
the end, eluding conviction may not be enough. The Act permits
states to subject welfare recipients to drug tests and to deny them ben-
efits if they test positive, whether or not they have been convicted of a
drug crime.20 7 For these reasons, this particular supplemental sanc-
tion appears to have had relatively little affect on state proceedings. 20 8
2. Public Housing
Congress has also sought to deny public housing benefits to drug
offenders and other criminals. Under federal law, all federally as-
sisted public housing agencies must include in their leases a provision
stating that
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-
related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a
public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or
any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause
for termination of tenancy.20 9
In other words, when any member or guest of a tenant household
engages in criminal activity, the entire household may be evicted for
violating the lease. Under Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) regulations, eviction is mandatory when a member of
the household has been convicted of manufacturing
methamphetamine on housing grounds.2 10 Otherwise eviction is dis-
cretionary,2 11 and the regulations encourage the housing authority to
consider all of the circumstances, including the seriousness of the of-
fense, the interests of other household members, contrition, and re-
habilitation, before taking any action.2 12 These eviction policies are
206 See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(b) (2000). Another noteworthy aspect of this law is that, con-
trary to Lautenberg and some provisions of the INA discussed above, it is not retroactive in
effect. Id. § 862a(d) (2). This means welfare recipients do not have a reason to reopen
cases and convictions that predate the statute.
207 Id. § 862b.
2o8 A comprehensive search of state and federal case law, news sources, and legal peri-
odicals failed to uncover any documented cases in which the welfare ban had affected a
state criminal case.
209 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(0(6).
210 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(b)(5)(i)(A) (2004). The rules for eviction generally apply to the
decision whether to admit the household as well. See id. § 960.204. The rules governing
public housing authorities, federally assisted housing, and private landlords who accept
Section 8 housing vouchers are virtually identical. See id. §§ 5.850-5.903, 982.310.
211 See id. § 966.4(/)(5)(i)-(ii).
212 Id. § 966.4(/(5)(vii).
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intended to control crime in public housing communities by remov-
ing criminals from them.
2 1 3
On the one hand, the stakes of the public housing ban are much
higher than the stakes of the welfare ban. The welfare ban applies
only to convicted drug offenders, and it does not affect the eligibility
of dependents or other parties. By contrast, the public housing ban
can be used to expel an entire household from a public housing com-
munity based upon the criminal activity of just one of its members. 214
Families obviously have a strong interest in retaining their leases,
but once again, the details of the ban and the characteristics of those
it affects limit its impact on state criminal proceedings. As with wel-
fare beneficiaries, most public housing tenants cannot afford exten-
sive legal representation in criminal cases. Even if they could afford
such representation, a protracted legal battle would do them little
good. First, unlike the welfare ban, this ban can be triggered by mere
criminal activity, and not just by criminal conviction. A housing au-
thority may evict tenants based on its own determination that relevant
criminal activity has taken place.2 1 5 Second, eviction is not mandatory
in most cases.21 6 Hardship cases can be screened out during the evic-
tion process itself, rather than during the criminal case. 217 Indeed,
thousands of tenant families have reached settlements with HUD that
permit them to stay in their apartments in return for excluding the
particular family members or guests who had caused the problems, or
by taking other measures short of exclusion. 2 18 For all of these rea-
sons, this particular federal sanction has not played a major docu-
mented role in state or federal criminal cases.
213 See President's Remarks, supra note 22, at 582-83 (announcing one strike policy to
help "restore the rule of law to public housing").
214 The Supreme Court has upheld lease terms permitting housing authorities to evict
so-called "innocent parties" on the basis of criminal activity undertaken by persons under
their control. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
215 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(1) (5) (iii).
216 In March 1996, however, President Clinton pledged to enforce lease terms more
strictly, announcing a policy that housing authorities may evict tenants at the first sign of
trouble. See Karen Gullo, Housing Policy Brings Evictions of Troubleinakers, AsSOClA-En PRESS,
Dec. 9, 1997. A survey of only half of the nation's housing authorities indicated that they
evicted 3,847 tenants in the first six months following announcement of the policy. Id.
217 To evict a tenant household, the housing authority must usually file a court or
administrative action and give the tenants the opportunity to contest the accuracy or rele-
vance of the grounds for eviction. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(4); see also Hous. Auth. v. Keys,
761 N.E.2d 338, 341-42, 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that a tenant was not in control
of her grandson-who shot a man in the tenant's unit-where she was unaware of the
criminal activity on the premises, and upholding the lower court's denial of the housing
authority's request to evict the tenant).
218 See Gullo, supra note 216.
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3. Student Financial Aid
Section 483 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1998
(HEA) bars any student who has been convicted of certain drug of-
fenses from obtaining federal financial aid, including grants, loans,
and work-study2 19 The ban's duration depends on the number of
convictions and the nature of each offense. A student is ineligible to
receive federal aid for one year following the first conviction for mere
possession of a controlled substance, and for two years following the
first conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance.22 0 The HEA
imposes longer terms of ineligibility for subsequent convictions of
each type of offense. 221 According to the law's sponsor, Representa-
tive Mark Souder of Indiana, the drug disqualification provision is in-
tended to deter students from using or trafficking in drugs, to prevent
students from using federal funds to buy drugs, and to encourage stu-
dents who use drugs to seek treatment. 222 To achieve the latter goal,
the HEA provides that convicted students who undergo a qualified
drug treatment program may regain aid eligibility.2 23
The ban is executed when a student with a disqualifying convic-
tion applies for financial aid. The Free Application for Federal Stu-
dent Aid (FAFSA) form queries students about prior drug
convictions. 224 Since the law took effect in July 2000, more than
128,000 applicants have acknowledged a drug conviction on the
FAFSA and have been denied aid as a result.2 2 5 Figure 3 below depicts
the law's impact since inception:
219 Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 483(f), 112 Stat.
1581, 1736-37 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2000)). Convictions obtained
before the student's eighteenth birthday do not trigger the ban, unless the student was
tried as an adult. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., 2004-2005 FREE APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL STU-
DENT AID (FAFSA): WORKSHEET FOR QUESTION 31 [hereinafter FAFSA WORMSHEE r], availa-
ble at http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/q31wksht.pdf.
220 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (1).
221 The student is denied aid for two years following the second possession offense,
and indefinitely following any subsequent possession offense or a second trafficking-re-
lated offense. Id.
222 Mark Souder, Actions Have Consequences: Opposing View: Federal Student Aid is a Privi-
lege that Drug Abuse Can Jeopardize, USA TODAY, June 13, 2000, at 16A.
223 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(2).
224 See FAFSA, supra note 25.
225 See E-mail from Dan Madzelan, supra note 4.
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FIGURE 3: APPLICANTS DECLARED INELIGIBLE FOR AID BECAUSE OF
DRUG CONVICTION
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* In 2000-01, students who failed to complete the drug question were not counted as
having disqualifying convictions.
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These figures probably do not depict the law's full impact, as they do
not include students who may have been dissuaded from applying for
aid in the first instance because of the drug disqualification
provision. 226
The ban is surely a significant penalty for those students who can-
not afford college out of pocket and do not have access to other forms
of financing. For most drug crimes, however, the ban is short-lived;
thus, it seems as though the aforementioned figures overstate the
law's impact on students seeking aid. But for some students, even a
short-term ban on aid could be life-altering. Putting off college even
for one year may mean never attending college at all, and students
who are forced to postpone or interrupt their college education are
less likely to complete their studies and graduate. 22 7
In many cases, the HEA's sanction is out of proportion to the
nature of the student's offense. Consider that the law distinguishes
only between trafficking and possession, and between first, second,
and subsequent offenses. The law does not consider the particular
circumstances of an individual case, such as the type or quantity of
226 On the other hand, it should be noted that some portion of the 128,000 who were
not qualified to receive aid may have failed to satisfy other criteria as well and therefore
would not have been eligible anyway; and some students may have been double-counted if
they re-applied for aid before regaining eligibility.
227 See, e.g., Letter from the Coalition for Higher Education Act Reform to the House
Education and Workforce Committee (May 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/
DrugPolicy/DrugPolic) .cfm?ID=10314&c=20.
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drug involved. The Coalition for Higher Education Act Reform con-
tends that the "vast majority of young people convicted of drug of-
fenses are convicted of simple, nonviolent possession. '228
Simply put, the sanction can be harsh and thus give students an
added incentive to contest the enforcement of state drug laws. Never-
theless, this sanction is unlikely to result in more trials, because those
who stand to lose most from the ban are those who are least able to do
anything about it. Students needing financial aid generally cannot af-
ford adequate trial representation.2 2 9 In any event, one must ask
whether taking a case to trial would cost any less than would simply
waiting out the ban. Standing trial is a costly way to save a few thou-
sand dollars in aid, particularly since the student is by no means as-
sured of winning.
Even so, the student could still ask for mercy. It costs the student
very little to ask a prosecutor for a plea that does not jeopardize her
financial aid. For the prosecutor who is queasy about the federal con-
sequences of a minor drug infraction, it does not cost much to honor
such a request. Compared to deportation, the ban is much easier to
circumvent because the HEA (apparently) uses a much narrower defi-
nition of "conviction. '23 0 Thus, for example, the state court could de-
fer judgment and dismiss the charges against the student after she
completed a probationary term or treatment program, and the ban
would not be triggered as long as the state did not consider this to be
a conviction.
Several communities have indicated a willingness to help students
retain their aid eligibility. In Madison, Wisconsin, for example, city
leaders have urged local police to issue city citations rather than press
criminal charges for marijuana possession. Under the city code, cita-
tions are not part of the public record, and even if they are considered
convictions, they could not be found by federal aid administrators try-
ing to enforce the ban.231 The Eugene, Oregon, City Council, de-
cided to give individuals caught in possession of marijuana the
opportunity to enroll in a diversion program (taking one all-day class)
that would also permit them to avoid the federal financial aid ban.232
228 Id.
229 The Coalition for Higher Education Act Reform adds that the vast majority of stu-
dents denied aid have family incomes of $30,000 or less. Id. Compared to students from
wealthier families, these students are much less likely to be adequately represented by
counsel. Id.
230 See FAFSA WORKSHEET, supra note 219; supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
231 SeeJudith Davidoff, Olson: Let Medical Users Grow Pot, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.)
Aug. 20, 2002, at IB.
232 See Jeff Wright, Council Increases Marijuana Fine, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.),
Feb. 11, 2003, at Dl. Citizens in Columbia, Missouri, voted on an unsuccessful proposal
that would have softened penalties for marijuana possession. See Columbia Marijuana Pro-
position Worries Law Enforcement, POST-TRiB. (Jefferson City, Mo.), Apr. 1, 2003, at 3. Under
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The HEA drug ban might also lead students to alter their interac-
tions with police to avoid the sanction. Many minor drug cases stem
from searches of personal belongings (backpacks, cars, etc.) to which
the students have voluntarily consented. With the adoption of the
HEA, students now have added motivation to withhold their consent
when approached by the police. Speakers at college campuses have
encouraged students to vigorously assert their civil rights when con-
fronted by police by refusing consent to warrant-less searches and by
refusing to speak to police without first speaking to a lawyer.233
There are a number of other ways a student can keep her finan-
cial aid even if she is convicted of a covered drug offense. One possi-
bility is to have the conviction removed from the student's record.
Unlike the INA, which gives no effect to expungements, the HEA in-
structs students not to count convictions "that have been removed
from your record" when filling out the FAFSA.234 In states that grant
expungements for drug crimes, this option might be the most cost-
effective way to circumvent the sanction.23 5
Although the drug conviction question is not optional, as a blank
response is treated as a conviction,2 36 a student could deny the convic-
tion on the FAFSA to retain her aid eligibility. Of course, doing so is a
crime, and if the student is caught in the lie, she will have to repay any
aid received and could face a $20,000 fine and prison time.2 37 Never-
theless, the chances of being caught violating the HEA are exceed-
ingly slim. Lisa Cain, from the Office of Student Financial Assistance
Programs, Department of Education, has candidly admitted that
"[t]he government does not have the capability at this time to back-
ground check all applicants' records in order to determine if they
have a drug conviction. We are relying on the students to use good
judgment when answering [the drug conviction question]. " 238 Of
the proposal, misdemeanor marijuana possession offenses would have been punishable
only by fines and hence would not become part of a person's state criminal record. Id. A
student who wished to help other students avoid the loss of aid under federal law formu-
lated the proposition. Id.
233 See, e.g., Katie Will, Experts Advise on Drug Polity, DAILY CARDINAL (Madison, Wis.),
Apr. 17, 2003, at http://www.dailycardinal.com/news/2003/O4/17/News/Experts.Advise.
On.Drug.Policy-420183.shtml.
234 FAFSA WORKSHEET, supra note 219; see also 20 U.S.C. §1091(r) (2) (B) (2000) (not-
ing that a student may resume eligibility if the conviction is "reversed, set aside, or other-
wise rendered nugatory").
235 Rhode Island once again provides useful data for a case study. The state expunged
582 convictions and nolo contendere pleas for simple possession of marijuana in 2000, the
year the HEA provision first took effect, compared to only 161 the year before. E-mail
from Michael Tenney, supra note 187. The state expunged another 573 convictions and
nolo pleas in 2001. Id.
236 See E-mail from Dan Madzelan, supra note 4.
237 See FAFSA, supra note 25.
238 Kempner, supra note 26.
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course, the fact that 128,000 applicants have nonetheless admitted a
drug history indicates that lying is not a palatable option for many
students.
A student who has been denied aid due to a drug conviction may
also regain her eligibility by completing an approved drug treatment
program, 259 or the student may seek other aid to compensate for the
loss of federal support. The John W. Perry Fund, for example, awards
scholarships to students who have been denied federal support be-
cause of HEA.2 40 In addition, at least four colleges (Hampshire,
Swarthmore, Yale, and Western Washington) have promised to re-
place federal aid that was denied because of a drug conviction.
241
While these last two options are of less practical significance, they help
to reduce the emphasis on state drug cases and the likelihood that
HEA will have any effect upon them.
The foregoing discussions have shown that each of these bans on
federal benefits has only muted effects on state criminal proceedings.
This is consistent with the theory developed in Part I: The benefits
bans apply to individuals who are unable to aggressively contest state
criminal charges and are also designed quite differently from the
sanctions that were shown earlier to cast dark shadows over state crim-
inal cases. Each of the bans is, for example, limited in duration or
arguably less severe than deportation or the loss of a career. While
this is not an endorsement of these benefits bans, it is a reminder not
to condemn every federal supplemental sanction on efficiency or fair-
ness grounds.
III
LIFTING THE SHADOW
Whether deporting criminal aliens, taking guns away from do-
mestic abusers, or denying public assistance to drug offenders are de-
sirable policies in the abstract is beyond the scope of this Article. The
focus throughout has been on the means Congress has chosen to exe-
cute these sanctions, a topic that commentators have thus far ne-
glected. Part I explained how using state convictions to levy the
sanctions carries hidden costs. Part II demonstrated that the theory
comports with reality; some, but not all, of the federal supplemental
sanctions do in fact affect the handling and outcomes of state criminal
239 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (r) (2). A problem is, the treatment program may last nearly as
long as the ban itself.
240 See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War
on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6J. GENDER, RACE & JusTICE 61, 85 n.119 (2002).
241 See Yilu Zhao, Yale's Policy Makes Stand on Drug Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002, at B2.
Yale, for example, has promised to reimburse students for federal financial aid lost because
of a drug conviction so long as they agree to undergo rehabilitation, which is covered by
student health insurance. Id.
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cases. This Part suggests ways for Congress and the states to address
these concerns.
A. Congress
Congress has unmatched ability to mitigate the effect its sanctions
have on the states. Congress could start by giving parties a meaningful
opportunity to contest the imposition of a federal sanction after they
have been convicted of a qualifying state offense. For example, Con-
gress could offer convicts a way to petition the federal government to
suspend a sanction on equitable grounds.2 42 Indeed, until very re-
cently, it was not unusual for Congress to give sanctionable parties the
opportunity to contest a sanction postconviction. As discussed in Part
II.A above, prior to the 1996 amendments to immigration law, the
Attorney General had discretionary authority to waive deportation
under section 212(c). While Congress would have to pick up the tab,
it would gain more control over the dispensation of discretionary re-
lief. Alternatively, Congress could give the states the choice whether
to impose a sanction in a given case. This is not without precedent.
Recall that prior to 1990, Congress authorized state judges to suspend
deportation when they deemed it disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted by an alien.2 4 3 And today, state legislatures remain free to de-
cide whether to adopt or modify the federal welfare benefits ban.
Deemphasizing state convictions would not eliminate all of the
problems associated with supplemental sanctions. Anyone who could
not satisfy the standards for equitable relief from the federal govern-
ment would focus his energies on the state's criminal case instead.
Nothing short of lifting the sanctions altogether would eliminate the
resulting implementation costs. Even so, formal postconviction relief
could be a cheaper alternative to more trials and circumvention
through other means. What is more, formalizing relief might pro-
mote fairness and consistency across the system.
Congress could also reduce the severity of the sanctions. For ex-
ample, Congress could bar domestic abusers from possessing firearms
in the home, when they are most likely be used against a spouse or
partner, but not on the job. (Public employees are currently exempt
from every provision of the Gun Control Act except the Lautenberg
242 Recall that Congress encourages public housing authorities to consider the totality
of the circumstances before evicting a tenant convicted of a drug offense. See supra note
212 and accompanying text. For a discussion of proposals to make collateral sanctions
more flexible, see generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE (THIRD EDITION): COL-
LATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.5 (2003)
[hereinafter ABA] (recommending authorization for courts to waive or modify the collat-
eral consequences of a criminal conviction), available at http://www.abanet.org/leader
ship/recommendations03/103A.pdf.
243 See supra note 122.
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Amendment.2 44) The ban would be less severe if it did not occasion
the loss of a job-and therefore much less likely to provoke resis-
tance-but arguably no less effective in achieving its primary objective
of incapacitation.
Aside from reducing the emphasis on state convictions and the
severity of the sanctions, Congress could compensate the states for the
added cost of enforcing state law. For example, it could give the states
grants to hire more police and prosecutors to work on cases triggering
federal supplemental sanctions. 245 Such grants would offset the im-
plementation costs of the sanctions, and they would make circumven-
tion less likely by eliminating prosecutorial budget constraints. It
would also force Congress to consider more carefully the true costs of
its sanctions.
Congress should broaden the reach of its sanctions only as a last
resort. Congress has used this tactic in the past to thwart the circum-
vention of its sanctions. For example, it made more crimes and dispo-
sitions deportable under the INA and extended the federal firearms
ban to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. Broadening the
reach of the sanctions does make them more difficult for state prose-
cutors to circumvent. But this tactic standing alone is troubling for
two reasons. First, it does not address the reasons states circumvent
federal sanctions in the first instance: limited law enforcement budg-
ets and moral objections to the sanctions. Second, sanctions that ap-
ply broadly are ipso facto more likely to be unfair than sanctions that
apply narrowly. Deporting murderers and rapists, for example, raises
fewer proportionality concerns than deporting murderers, rapists, and
shoplifters.
B. The States
We have already seen how states have responded to federal sup-
plemental sanctions. State officials treat some cases no differently in
the shadow of the sanctions, despite the added costs. Commonly,
however, these officials thwart the sanctions by charging nonqualify-
ing crimes in place of qualifying ones, expunging prior convictions,
and refusing to assist federal authorities in tracking down state offend-
ers who are subject to the sanctions. These reactions are far from
244 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1) (2000).
245 In fact, Congress has already provided grants to help states enforce domestic abuse
laws. See, e.g., Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 40231, 108 Stat. 1796, 1932 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3789hh (2003)) (au-
thorizing the Attorney General to make $120 million in grants to states from 1996-98 to
encourage them to treat domestic violence as a "serious violation of the criminal law" by
implementing mandatory arrest programs, educating police and judges on how to handle
domestic violence cases, and creating specialized units for responding to domestic
violence).
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optimal. Th_--r,. there may be little else state officials can do, this
section suggests a few other modest measures for states to consider.
On the one hand, a state could try to make it easier for its officials
to circumvent the federal sanctions without diluting deterrence. One
way to do this would be to automatically expunge criminal convictions
that trigger federal sanctions. 246 This would lift the federal shadow
over criminal cases, though it would also eliminate any state collateral
sanctions stemming from the conviction. To compensate, the state
could increase the criminal punishment it imposes. 247 In this way, the
state could step out of the shadow of federal sanctions while maintain-
ing the level of punishment it deems optimal for the crime. This strat-
egy will not work, of course, if Congress ordains that an expungement
shall not clear a conviction for purposes of federal law, as it did with
the INA.
Then again, the states could exploit the federal sanctions for state
purposes. Recall that one shortcoming of federal supplemental sanc-
tions is that potential perpetrators are not aware of them. The ex ante
lack of awareness of the sanctions undermines their deterrence value.
To enhance the deterrent effect, the states could advertise the sanc-
tions more prominently.2 48 The benefit of increased deterrence
might exceed the cost of the publicity campaign and possibly even the
implementation costs of the sanctions.
IV
THE SHADOW OF OTHER SANCTIONS
Until now, this Article has focused exclusively on sanctions levied
by the federal government and based on determinations made by the
states. But the framework used to analyze federal supplemental sanc-
tions can be applied to sanctions imposed and determinations made
by any two parties. The core insight of the Article is that when one
party attaches new consequences to determinations made by a second
party, it may distort the way those determinations are made. In the-
ory, those determinations could be made by the federal government
or even private parties, rather than the states. Likewise, it might be
the states or private parties, rather than the federal government, who
246 See, e.g., Demleiner, supra note 20, at 162 (advocating states automatically expunge
criminal records after a certain period of time).
247 The ABA standards on collateral sanctions recommend that courts consider collat-
eral sanctions at sentencing. See ABA, supra note 242, Standard 19-2.4.
248 See, e.g., Project Exile: The Safe Streets and Neighborhoods Act of 2000: Hearing on H.R.
4051 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 73 (2000)
(testimony of Michael T. McCaul, Special Assistant to the Texas Attorney General)
(describing Texas's use of advertisements on billboards, public transportation, and televi-
sion and radio to raise awareness of added prison time for gun crimes).
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use the determination for their own purposes. This Part briefly dis-
cusses these other types of supplemental sanctions.
A. Private Supplements to Public Determinations
Private citizens may impose their own sanctions on individuals
whom the government has labeled as "criminals." For example, a vic-
tim of a violent crime may sue her attacker in tort, an employer may
terminate or refuse to hire someone with a criminal record, and the
public may scorn a sex offender living in the community. Each of
these private sanctions goes above and beyond whatever sanction has
been imposed by the government.
A victim of violent crime often may sue in tort to recover compen-
satory and punitive damages from the assailant. Recovery in tort may
greatly exceed any restitution ordered by a criminal court as part of
sentencing, and thus adds to the direct sanction imposed by the gov-
ernment at the conclusion of a criminal proceeding.2 49 To be sure, a
tort action is not dependent upon a successful criminal prosecution.
A victim may file suit regardless of the outcome of a criminal prosecu-
tion or even if the government took no action at all against her at-
tacker. 250 But a criminal conviction would still be useful for the
plaintiff-victim; it would conclusively establish certain facts essential to
her tort suit, and a defendant would want to avoid conviction for this
reason (among others). 251 Even so, the threat of a pending tort ac-
tion is not likely to affect criminal prosecutions in any significant
way.2 52 Victims are more likely to file tort actions in egregious cases,
249 See generally George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which
Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute, 15 A.L.R.Sth 391, § 2 (1993) (noting that many
states do not allow sentencing courts to order restitution for pain and suffering and other
nonfinancial losses); GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 47, at § 5El.1 (court may order resti-
tution in the amount of the victim's actual loss).
250 The 0.1. Simpson case illustrates the point. Simpson was found civilly liable-in
the amount of $33.25 million-for the deaths of Ron Goldman and his ex-wife Nicole
Brown Simpson, despite the fact that he had been acquitted of their murders by a jury in
the state's criminal case against him. Date SetforAuction of Simpson Memorabilia, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1999, at B4.
Private RICO actions provide another example. A private plaintiff may prevail on a
civil RICO claim whether or not the defendant has been convicted of a criminal RICO
violation or even the predicate acts of such a violation. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 491 n.9, 493 (1985) (recognizing that barring a plaintiff from pursuing a civil
RICO claim after a defendant has been acquitted of a criminal RICO charge would "create
peculiar incentives for plea bargaining to non-predicate-act offenses so as to ensure immu-
nity from a later civil suit").
251 See discussion of collateral estoppel, supra note 23. But an acquittal in the criminal
case does not shield the defendant from tort liability the way it shields him from federal
supplemental sanctions, for the victim-plaintiff may prevail on her claim by satisfying a
lower evidentiary standard than the government must meet.
252 If anything, it seems much more likely that the criminal proceeding could have an
adverse effect on the civil one. A defendant in a civil case who fears subsequent criminal
prosecution may refuse to testify at the civil trial, citing her Fifth Amendment right against
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which as a general matter also trigger steeper government sanctions.
In theory, the threat of tort liability will not overshadow criminal pun-
ishment in these cases. It will of course give a defendant added rea-
son to contest state charges, but in many cases, the defendant will not
need any additional incentive to spend freely on his defense; the pun-
ishment threatened by the state alone will provide enough of an in-
ducement. Consider the O.J. Simpson case. It seems reasonable to
suppose that Simpson would have hired the same pricey "legal dream
team" in the state's case even if there was no possibility the family of
one of his victims would later sue him in tort (and recover $33.25
million). The prospect of facing life in prison standing alone should
have been enough to convince him to finance every last gambit that
might reduce his odds of conviction.
Sanctions levied by employers may affect a larger number of crim-
inal cases. Many employers refuse to hire applicants with criminal
records. A recent study indicated that about 80% of large companies
and nearly 70% of smaller businesses conduct criminal background
checks on job applicants. 253 For some crimes, lost earning potential
due to conviction may overshadow the sentence imposed by the
state.2 54 Moreover, employers rely heavily upon state conviction
records in screening employees; that is, few of them attempt to evalu-
ate employee dangerousness de novo, thus placing heavy emphasis on
the outcomes of state criminal proceedings. 255
Society imposes its own sanctions on criminals as well, often la-
beled as shame sanctions. Consider the harsh treatment often ac-
corded registered sex offenders. Once they complete their sentences,
many convicted sex offenders are prevented from resuming "normal"
lives-living, working, or socializing where they please. Neighbors
shun contact with them, picket their houses, and resort to even more
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964)
(rejecting a "rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness to
give testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction").
This may make it more difficult for the private plaintiff to prevail on her tort claim.
253 See Ann Zimmerman, Wal-Mart Toughens Job Screening, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 12, 2004, at
A3 (noting that the figures are rising, as employers respond to a rise in lawsuits against
them by victims of crimes committed by their employees on the job); see also Devah Pager,
The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am. J. SOCIoLOGY 937, 960 (2003) (reporting that ex-
offenders are one-third or one-half as likely as non-offenders to be considered by employ-
ers for jobs).
254 See e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug
Convictions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 159, 160-61 (1992)
(estimating that a large portion of the financial penalty for various crimes is attributable to
loss in postconviction earnings).
255 Zimmerman, supra note 253. Some dismiss the possibility that convicts may avoid
this private sanction by lying to employers. In addition to overestimating the chances they
would be caught in the lie during a background check, convicts also fear being revealed by
their parole officers who frequently call employers to check tip on their wards. Pager,
supra note 253, at 963.
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extreme measures to drive sex offenders from their communities. 256
The threat of shame sanctions could thus distort sex crime prosecu-
tions, particularly if shame is applied indiscriminately to all sex
crimes-from child molestation to indecent exposure-regardless of
the seriousness of the individual offense. 257
But private sanctions like tort suits, adverse employment actions,
and shame differ from federal supplemental sanctions in one critical
respect: States can in theory block private parties from using convic-
tions to inflict these sanctions, thus lifting the shadows these sanctions
may cast. Both federal and state law already limit when employers
may use convictions in hiring and firing decisions. Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, for example, employers may only deny employ-
ment to a convicted offender if the conviction is relevant to the job.2 58
States may restrict the public's access to sex offender registries,
thereby making it more difficult for the public to find and shame sex
offenders. States may also limit tort damages in cases in which the
defendant has been convicted by the state. By contrast, states cannot
prohibit the federal government from using state criminal determina-
tions, nor even withhold conviction records from it.2 5 9 This is not to
say that private sanctions never affect state determinations; in fact,
they almost certainly do.260 Rather, the point is that states have it in
their power to do more to limit the use of their convictions by private
parties, should they find a need to do so.
B. State Supplements to Federal Determinations
The states also sanction individuals whom the federal govern-
ment determines have committed crimes. States disenfranchise, bar
from public employment, prohibit from jury service, deny licenses to,
and restrict the firearms rights of parties convicted of various crimes,
regardless of the jurisdiction of conviction.2 6 1 One might expect
256 See, e.g., Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on
Megan's Laws, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing cases).
257 For an interesting analysis of the effect of nonlegal (namely, shaming) sanctions on
the prosecution of sex offenders, see id.
258 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has interpreted Tide
VII of the Civil Rights Act to limit the use of conviction records by employers. U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 604 app. A (1993), available at
WL EEOCCM App. 604. Many states have similar laws. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321
(West 1998).
259 See, e.g., supra note 120.
260 See, e.g., Brett Barrouquere, Menard Rescinds Plea in Sex Case, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIB. . Sept. 9, 1999, at 3B (discussing case of thirty-five-year old man who withdrew his
guilty plea to lewd and lascivious acts on a child for seducing a fourteen-year-old girl, after
he discovered the plea would require him to register as a sex offender in Florida).
261 See sources cited supra note 2.
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these state sanctions to loom over federal proceedings much the same
way federal sanctions loom over state proceedings.
Nonetheless, state use of federal determinations is unlikely to dis-
tort federal criminal prosecutions for three reasons. First, Congress
arguably may preempt any state sanction predicated upon a federal
conviction, something states cannot do when the federal government
uses their determinations. 262 Second, if a state decides to sanction an
individual convicted of a federal offense in federal court, that person
could circumvent the state sanction by moving to another state, rather
than by contesting the federal charge more vigorously. 2 3 With the
exception of the welfare ban, federal sanctions apply in all fifty states
once triggered; their shadow follows the convict wherever he might
go. Third, while states do levy some supplemental sanctions, few if
any can be considered as serious or as harsh as the federal sanctions
considered in Part II above. For all of these reasons, state sanctions
are not likely to cast much of a shadow over criminal cases brought by
the federal government.
C. Public Supplements to Private Determinations
A third variety of supplemental sanction involves government-im-
posed penalties triggered by private legal actions, like civil suits. Puni-
tive damages in tort law are a prime example. To illustrate, suppose
only one out of every five tort victims is compensated for harms suf-
fered. To ensure the tort system adequately deters tortfeasors, the
government may provide that every tortfeasor who is found liable shall
pay punitive damages of four times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages involved in that particular case. 264 Suppose further that the gov-
ernment "decouples" the damages award to ensure the multiplier
does not encourage the filing of too many suits; in the simplest case,
262 See Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, _ , 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004) (hold-
ing that "any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA
remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted"); see also Ronald.j. Greene, Hybrid State Law
in theFederal Courts, 83 -AR. L. REv. 289, 300 (1969) (noting that "not every federal regula-
tory statute states a policy which Congress would wish to have reinforced by additional
remedies" provided by the states, and thereby could be preempted by congressional legisla-
tion). Interestingly, the Supreme Court seems aware of the problems states might cause
the federal government were they given the opportunity to "supplement" federal regula-
tory regimes in the same way Congress supplements state regulations. SeeAetna Health, 542
U.S. at __ 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
263 The same logic suggests that sanctions imposed by one state based on convictions
obtained in another state will not affect the enforcement of the other state's criminal laws.
264 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 I-aRv. L. REv. 869 (1998) (discussing theory behind and examples of damages
multipliers).
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the plaintiff keeps only the compensatory damages award, while the
government keeps the rest.265
The punitive damages award adds to, or supplements, the com-
pensatory damages award. Like any other supplemental sanction, it
may affect the way a defendant responds to the claim against him.
The defendant will try to circumvent the sanction, and if he fails he
may spend more heavily on his defense. In this case, however, the
total sanction imposed may increase when the parties bargain around
the punitive award. The reason is that parties can circumvent the
sanction without reducing the compensatory award: The settlement
agreement will not trigger the sanction, no matter the amount of
damages paid. (By contrast, recall that guilty pleas typically trigger
the same supplemental sanctions as guilty verdicts, meaning the state
must often reduce the plea charge to entice a defendant to accept a
plea agreement.) 26 6 Since the defendant would be willing to pay a
premium to avoid this supplemental sanction, we might expect more
cases to settle and average settlement amounts to increase in the
shadow of punitive damages awards.
Of course, if the case does not settle, the threat of the punitive
damages award gives a defendant an incentive to fight the tort suit all
the more aggressively and thereby makes it more costly for private
plaintiffs to litigate their claims.2 67 Imagine, for example, that a pri-
vate citizen files a tort suit seeking compensatory damages of $100,000
and the case fails to settle. The plaintiff will litigate the suit as though
it were worth a maximum of $100,000 and spend no more than
$100,000 discounted by the probability she will prevail, but the defen-
dant will treat the claim as though it were worth $500,000 if successful;
the defendant may be willing to outspend the plaintiff to the point at
which the plaintiff will no longer find it worthwhile to bring the claim.
Some plaintiffs in essence are forced to sue on behalf of other victims
who contribute nothing to the effort to hold a defendant accountable,
at least when the exemplary damages are pocketed by the govern-
265 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky, Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Les-
sons from the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1231-36 (1986) (demonstrating that
there is no equilibrium in which a multiplier provides both optimal deterrence to the
defendant and optimal enforcement incentives to the plaintiff, but failing to recognize that
the damages multiplier may increase a defendant's incentive to spend on its defense).
266 Supra notes 37 and 60.
267 Choi and Sanchirico suggest that, by raising the stakes of civil litigation, punitive
damages may cause defendants to devote more resources to their defense, thereby making
it less attractive for plaintiffs to file civil suits in the first instance. Albert Choi & Chris
William Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation
Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J. LEG. STUD. 323, 327 (2004). They conclude that
punitive damages may be welfare reducing. Id. at 328. They also claim that settlement
does not avoid the problem altogether. The fact that the defendant would be willing to
outspend the plaintiff at trial reduces the plaintiff's bargaining power, resulting in lower
settlement payouts. Id. at 341-44.
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ment. Though their suits have become more difficult to prosecute,
these plaintiffs are not compensated for the additional burden they
bear.
Predicting how these two processes-one suggesting more settle-
ments and larger payouts and the other suggesting more expensive
trials and fewer filings-will affect total sanctions is beyond the scope
of this Article. The point is simply that supplemental sanctions which
are easy to circumvent may not reduce the average total sanction im-
posed; they may even have the desired effect of increasing total sanc-
tions, though not by the amount or in the manner that was originally
intended.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined an important yet overlooked form of
federal regulation implicating both efficiency and fairness concerns:
federal statutes that impose sanctions when state officials determine
that a state law has been violated. The Article argues that federal sup-
plemental sanctions distort the enforcement of state law. By raising
the stakes involved in state cases, the sanctions give defendants added
incentive to contest state charges and hence raise the cost of enforc-
ing state laws. To avoid burdening state budgets or to spare defend-
ants from sanctions they deem unjust, state prosecutors may bargain
around the sanctions in plea negotiations. In the process, however,
these prosecutors may be required to compromise other state objec-
tives, such as the deterrence of sanction-triggering crimes and the fair
application of state law. Further, even if they do not affect how the
states apply their own laws, federal supplemental sanctions may none-
theless be applied unfairly across states, given variations in how the
states define crime.
The Article proceeded to isolate the features of federal supple-
mental sanctions, state legal systems, and criminal defendants that de-
termine what the ultimate effect of any given sanction will be. The
Article theorized that severe and automatic sanctions will provoke
more resistance from defendants, as long as they can afford the cost of
waging a more vigorous legal battle with the state and doing so
reduces sufficiently their odds of conviction. The resources state pros-
ecutors have at their disposal determine whether they can meet the
defendant's challenge or whether they must instead help a defendant
find a way around the sanction. The breadth of the sanction and the
latitude state prosecutors have in making charging decisions deter-
mine how much the states will have to compromise state objectives to
circumvent the federal sanction. Finally, the attitudes of the partici-
pants in the states' criminal justice systems play a role in many aspects
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of the process, from bolstering defendants' chances of being acquit-
ted to softening prosecutors' approaches to handling certain crimes.
The Article substantiated the theory with five in-depth case stud-
ies of federal supplemental sanctions. As predicted, the deportation
of criminal aliens and the Lautenberg firearms ban, two severe sanc-
tions that flow automatically from a state conviction, dramatically in-
fluence state criminal cases that trigger them. By contrast, bans on
the receipt of various federal benefits have had a negligible effect on
state criminal cases, due in part to the less severe nature of such bans
and the limited wealth of defendants who face them. The Article also
suggested a variety of steps Congress and the states could take to re-
duce the hidden costs of sanctions or to enhance their benefits. Con-
gress could lift the shadow its sanctions cast by, for example, giving
defendants an opportunity to contest the imposition of a federal sanc-
tion postconviction. For their part, the states could use the sanctions
to better serve state objectives like deterrence by, for example, raising
awareness of the sanctions before crimes are committed.
Given that Congress lacks an adequate incentive to address these
problems, however, it is tempting to think the Supreme Court should
step in to restrict Congress's use of state determinations. The sanc-
tions do raise federalism concerns-for example, they shift costs onto
the states-but the laws imposing the sanctions transcend no recog-
nized limitation on congressional power. Congress has not exceeded
its substantive powers under Article I, as presently defined; it may de-
port lawless aliens, bar domestic abusers from possessing firearms that
that have moved in interstate commerce, and deny federal benefits to
drug users and drug pushers. 268 Nor has it ordered state officers to
help administer the sanctions;260 in theory, states remain free to de-
cide whether to prosecute domestic abuse, drug crimes, crimes com-
mitted by aliens, and so on. Restricting Congress's use of state
determinations would thus require the Court to extend recent hold-
ings. The Court could, for example, prohibit federals laws that in
practical effect, though not in word, compel the states to help imple-
ment federal supplemental sanctions. 270
268 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (affirming Congress's
power to regulate possession of firearms that move in or affect interstate commerce); Mar-
shall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) (affirming Congress's power to deny cer-
tain benefits to drug offenders); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07
(1893) (holding that Congress's power to deport aliens is virtually absolute).
269 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (affirming that Congress may
not command state officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program); see also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (establishing that Congress may not
direct state legislatures to address particular problems).
270 Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (recognizing that some federal
grants could be so coercive as to constitute compulsion).
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Much more could be said on this topic. For now, suffice it to say
that the difficulty of devising a rule by which to evaluate the sanctions
counsels againstjudicial review. Consider the problems attending two
different tests the Court could adopt. One is a rule prohibiting all
supplemental sanctions. Such a rule would be simple to apply, but it
would sweep too broadly. Recall that not all supplemental sanctions
burden the states. There is no good reason, as a matter of law or
policy, to stop Congress from using state determinations when doing
so does not distort the enforcement of state law. A second rule would
require the courts to balance the congressional interests in using state
determinations against the harm done to the states. Such a rule
would spare efficient sanctions, but it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for courts to administer. The precise effects of any given sanc-
tion depend on a multitude of factors, some of which the courts are
ill-equipped to analyze. Congress is much better able to evaluate the
practical effects of its sanctions. It also has more options at its disposal
for fixing any problems with the sanctions. Congress might even be
inclined to address the problems if it were only made aware of them;
after all, the distortion caused by the sanctions impairs congressional
aims as well. In sum, this particular federalism problem should be left
to the political branches, as imperfect as they are at protecting state
interests.
The Article has broader relevance as well. The core insight is that
attaching additional consequences to determinations made by an-
other party may result in less than optimal total sanctions: Determina-
tions become more costly to obtain and may no longer serve well the
policies of the party making them or the party using them. For exam-
ple, public shaming of convicted sex offenders may affect the way
states handle sex crimes, and the imposition of punitive damages may
discourage the filing of private tort actions. Sanctions imposed and
determinations made by any pair of distinct parties could be usefully
analyzed using the framework developed here.
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